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Abstract
Families are essential building blocks of human social organization. For most of human
history, families were fundamental economic and social elementary units (Chapais, 2009). Past
research has identified a relationship between family structure and political regimes, such that
specific types of kin organization seem to be typically associated with particular forms of political
regimes. Such systematic macro-level associations have held up to significant scientific scrutiny.
However, little research has attempted to provide detailed mechanistic accounts of those
associations. Notably absent from the literature are empirical studies into the possible association
between specific features of families and political orientations has been conducted. The
dissertation aims to address such gap. Relying on data from the European Social Survey, which
surveys beliefs and attitudes of people from across Europe, I focus on the relationship between
forms of kin groups, preference for stability, desire for individual autonomy, perception of social
cohesiveness, and preference for particular political expressions and types of government. The
analysis suggests that larger family size correlates with greater preference for stability, lower
desire for individual autonomy, perception of greater social cohesiveness, less tolerance for outlier
political expressions, and stronger preference for powerful central authority. Explanations for these
associations are provided.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
What motivates someone to approach the world in a prudent manner? It is well documented
in the literature that specific characteristics of individuals or of the social world may encourage
more careful or riskier behavioral strategies (Wang, Kruger, & Wilke, 2009; Giudice, Gangestad,
& Kaplan, 2015). Indeed, the life history stage at which agents find themselves does make a
significant difference for their general attitude toward life. Different life history stages present
different challenges, where either risk-taking or risk-aversion may turn out to be a more profitable
strategy (Daly & Wilson, 2005a). Indeed, age modulates risk-taking; younger individuals typically
are more likely to risk more (Dohmen, Falk, Golsteyn, Huffman, & Sunde, 2017). Sex differences
matter too. Males are more likely to behave in a risky manner than females (Wilson & Daly, 1985;
Byrnes, Miller, Schafer, 1999; Dwyer, Gilkeson, & List, 2002; Wang, Kruger, & Wilke, 2009).
The structure of the social world also modifies the payoff structure of behaving cautiously or
riskily. Unstable environments with short time horizons encourage individuals to risk more,
enabling the enjoyment of benefits that may not be available later (Brumbach, Figueredo, & Ellis,
2009; Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & Robertson, 2011). An additional potential contributing
component to acting cautiously or riskily that has not been systematically investigated is the size
and composition of the family.
All else being equal, given the specific constraints that come with particular familial and
social insertions, individuals may decide to systematically act cautiously, risking little, while
taking the necessary steps for maintaining the status quo. What specifically would motivate those
individuals to adopt such default strategy? I defend the main argument that the adoption of a
prudent attitude is specifically called for to protect momentous and consequential long-term
investments made in the familial and social world. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 investigate how living in a
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large family affects the preference for stability, the desire for individual autonomy, predilection
for social cohesiveness, and the means that make it possible.
Large families come with duties and obligations, which imply greater apportionment of
energy, time, and resources in priority to family-specific objectives. Familial obligations directly
compete with investments in non-kin based social networks and skills, and competences
acquisition, that could facilitate the adaption to complex and changing economic conditions.
Individuals deeply committed to his or her familial investments or depending on the maintenance
of such investments for their livelihood (i.e., dependent individuals) are at a significant
disadvantage in a fast-changing world. A generally conservative attitude toward social, political
and economic issues would be an appropriate strategic response, given the inherent risk of dramatic
changes for ongoing familial and social investments.

Background
Life History and the Family
Organisms move through life stages that require that specific adaptive challenges be met.
Life history theory specifies the age-, gender- and status-specific evolvability constraints that
organisms face when making strategic decisions of allocation of time, energy and resources to
chosen objectives among competing ones. Life history theory has implications for all aspects of
an organism’s growth, psychology, and behavior. Typical tradeoff involves the allocation of
resources either for growth and development, general somatic maintenance, or reproduction
(Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015).
Compared to many other species, human life history is relatively slow, with individuals
going through a protracted pre-reproductive phase, requiring much support and resource from
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those around (Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015). That extended period of time allows for the
acquisition of skills across multiple domains (e.g., social skills, technical competencies, etc.),
which increase the probability of being successful later in life (Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado,
2000; Lancaster & Kaplan, 2010). The resources invested in growth and development are not
immediately available for reproduction, however, the acquisition of social and human capitals that
those investments permit make future successful reproduction more probable.
At different stages in an organism’s life, the strategies employed reflect the challenges and
life circumstances faced. Indeed, newborns have to address distinct challenges from adolescents
(i.e., eliciting care vs. acquiring knowledge about the social environment) (Giudice, Gangestad, &
Kaplan, 2015). Meeting the demands of these distinct life history stages requires that our
psychology adapt to the new conditions at hand, so that we are motivated to respond. Maximizing
stage-specific life history strategies take into consideration environmental variables (e.g., resource
availability), as well as uncertainty and risk in the environment (Brumbach, Figueredo, & Ellis,
2009; Ellis, Figueredo, Brumbach, & Schlomer, 2009; Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & Robertson,
2011). For example, in high-risk environments, investing less in more growth and development,
in order to focus on reproduction, should be strategic, as life may be shorter and not allow for
enjoying the full benefit of one’s present investments.
At the point in an individual’s life where investing in a partnership and offspring takes
place, we should expect to observe a suite of psychological and behavioral changes to occur. An
optimal strategy for belonging to a family, whether as its creator or as one of its dependent
members, would be to contribute significant resources inward for familial objectives as soon as
capable to do so, while generally reducing risky activity and seeking greater stability. Investing
across generations is necessary for sustaining a family (Gurven, Stieglitz, Hooper, & Gomes, &
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Kaplan, 2012). Through sustained family investments, younger offspring are afforded the time to
gain the competencies that allow them to be successful in the future. Stage-specific psychological
adaptations should be expected, given how critical the family is to the fitness of members of our
species.
Family units are found across human cultures in some form or another (Murdock, 1949;
Brown, 1991; Geary & Flinn, 2001). Resources, time and energy investments in families come
with opportunity costs (de Moor & van Zanden, 2010; van Zanden, 2011). Anyone invested in a
family should be sensitive to the effects of uncertainty and destabilization, given the inherent risk
that those afford for the success of investments having been made. Certain types of families might
explain more conservative attitudes, independently of individuals’ respective dispositions and
regardless of the social and cultural conditions in which the agents found themselves.

Family Structure in Europe
Hajnal (1965) highlights the two dominant types of European households, which can be
described as sets of rules: 1) Northwest Europe simple household system primarily found in
Northwest Europe1 and, 2) joint household system outside of Northwest Europe. The Northwest
European simple household system is characterized by a late age of marriage (over 26 for men;
over 23 for women), husband and wife shared household responsibilities, and the outside
employment of young unmarried dependents. The joint household system is characterized by an
early age of marriage (under 26 for men; under 21 for women), and a hierarchical compound
household under the authority of an older couple. The Northwest European simple household
system has also been described as the European marriage pattern (EMP), which began to form
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Scandinavian countries (including Iceland, excluding Finland), the British Isles, the Low Countries, the Germanspeaking areas, and northern France
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around the 16th century. The EMP has two important features: 1) late age at marriage and, 2) a
significant number of individuals who stay unmarried (Hajnal, 1982).
Todd (1985; 1987) expanded on Hajnal’s original work on marriage, family types and
household structure by looking at how family organization influenced political outcomes.
Previously, the dominant thesis in the literature had proposed that the change in familial and
household structure was a response to other changes in the society, such as political and economic
changes, technological transformation, industrial revolutions, and acquisition of literacy (Todd,
1987). For Todd (1987) a mutual relationship between social, economic, and political development
and family structure might very well exist.
Todd developed a classification of family types based on the combination of family
structure and household features. He conceptualizes the family types as explanatory variables.
Accordingly, Todd suggests that political ideology might not have had a direct and all-determining
influence on the evolution of family forms. Instead, family forms may have had decisive influences
on the development and stabilization of specific types of political ideas and institutions. Todd’s
forms of families (1985; 1987; 1990) found in the European countries encompass several distinct
forms spanning a range from individualistic (e.g., absolute nuclear family) to extended family
types (e.g., asymmetrical community family)
Two of Todd’s family types are considered liberal, absolute nuclear and egalitarian
nuclear. Stem and communitarian family types are considered hierarchical and authoritarian.
Absolute nuclear and egalitarian types would foster individualism, demand little adherence to
tradition, and are associated with European regions where industrialization occurred early2. Stem
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E.g., England, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Northern France, Spain, north-central eastern Portugal and
Northern and Southern Italy
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and communitarian families are found in other regions3 and demand a strong adherence to
tradition. Individuals would adopt the norms prevalent in their respective type of family: in
communitarian households, hierarchical and authoritarian norms; in absolute nuclear families,
liberal norms (Todd, 1985).
Family types are associated with specific institutions and behavioral norms. Family values
manifest themselves in political ideology. Communitarian families would be more prone to align
with more extreme corporatist forms of political ideology (e.g., communist or fascist ideology).
Individuals from absolute nuclear families would likely exhibit more liberal political expressions
(Todd, 1990). While Todd makes a strong case for the association between family structure and
political ideology, the mechanisms by which preferences (e.g., political ideology) would be
transmitted and stabilized at a population level have not been fully elucidated.

Contemporary Research on Family Types
More recently, researchers across the social sciences have tested some of the ideas of
Hajnal (1965) and Todd (1985; 1987) using data on historical and contemporary populations.
Following Hajnal’s claim, de Moor and van Zanden (2010) found that delaying the age at marriage,
or staying unmarried, facilitate the accumulation of savings by diminishing the time and energy
investment to supporting a family, thus, allowing for resources to be shifted to other endeavors
that might not just be familistic. With the freeing up of resources, an increase of investments in
human capital (i.e., education, skills, and experience that an individual possesses) is possible.
Looking more specifically at human capital development, researchers have examined the ways in
which the EMP family structure has resulted in the transformation of women’s economic roles and
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E.g., Germany, Japan, Sweden, Southern France, Scotland, Belgium, Central Italy, Russia, China, Finland, central
France, northern Portugal, northern Spain, Central Italy
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social status (De Moor and van Zanden, 2010; Alesina & Giuliano, 2010; Carmichael & van
Zanden, 2015). Another path to economic development, the adoption of inclusive institutions,
seems to have been promoted by the more egalitarian character of the EMP (Greif & Tabellini,
2010). Dilli (2016) illustrates how family systems, as defined by Todd (1985), can be linked to the
adoption of less democratic forms of government. Using data from 127 countries between 1849
and 2009, the author finds that regions with nuclear families tend to be much more democratic
overall, while regions with authoritarian families tend to be less democratic.
Researchers have also examined the relationship between family cohesiveness and specific
sociopolitical and economic preferences (Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010; Alesina & Giuliano, 2010;
Alesina & Giuliano, 2013; Alesina, Algan, Cahuc, & Giuliano, 2015). The closer one feels to
his/her family, the lower the trust he/she gives to strangers (Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010). Strong
family ties might limit exposure to others, thus reducing the amount of experience involving
interactions with strangers (Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010). Further research has highlighted the role
that strong family ties have in the development of political behaviors and preferences. Such ties
are associated with lower interest in political activities. Strong ties are also associated with a
greater desire for market regulation (Alesina & Giuliano, 2013; Alesina, Algan, Cahuc, &
Giuliano, 2015).

Family and Political Life in Present-day Europe
This dissertation looks at how particular characteristics of families motivate individuals to
maintain certain social, economic, and political preferences and biases. To do this, I rely upon data
collected in 29 European countries, by the European Social Survey (ESS). The data in the ESS are
cross-sectional survey data that were collected by teams of field researchers between 2012-2013.
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The data represent 54,673 respondents, 15 years of age or older. While there are limitations to
using cross-section survey data, the benefits it provides are substantial. The ESS is a large-scale
representative survey. With over 50,000 participants, the size of the sample allows for greater
specification of statistical models by allowing for strong statistical controls. This provides the
ability to use multi-level models that include country-level effects and contextual variables, such
as country-level GDP. The modeling techniques it allows are stricter and more robust and, thus,
can provide greater precision in estimating coefficients, standard errors, and, thus, statistical
significance. The findings from this type of research design can be used to further develop more
controlled and fine-grained techniques, such as ethnographic field methods (e.g., participant
observation and in-depth interviewing), case studies, and laboratory and natural field experiments.

Size of Households Across Present-day Europe
Present-day Europe looks dramatically different than it did a few hundred years ago (Lee,
2003; Clark, 2007), including marriage and family life (Hajnal, 1965; Todd, 1985; de Vries, 2008).
Large, extended, and multi-generational families, where everyone lives under the same roof, are
not as prevalent today as they once were. For many, it is a requirement for offspring to leave the
family home and local area to gain skills and find gainful employment. Modern technology makes
dealing with geographic distance more affordable. Yet, we still find differences in size of
households between countries, as well as differences in variability of the size of households within
countries.
There are specific regions of Europe (e.g., Southern Europe) and countries (e.g., Albania)
with much larger households than others. Table 1 highlights the differences across Europe in
household size using the ESS (2012) data.
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Table 1. Household Size Across Europe
(ESS 2012)
Country
Mean Std. Dev Freq.
Albania
4.60
7.24 1,201
Belgium
2.84
1.44 1,869
Bulgaria
2.56
1.36 2,260
Cyprus
2.82
1.30 1,116
Czech-Republic
2.58
1.23 2,009
Denmark
2.78
4.07 2,958
Estonia
2.57
1.36 2,380
Finland
2.40
1.36 2,197
France
2.34
1.32 1,968
Germany
2.58
1.27 1,650
Great Britain
2.42
2.22 2,286
Hungary
2.69
1.47 2,014
Ireland
2.76
1.42 2,628
Israel
3.77
3.14 2,508
Iceland
3.47
6.02
752
Italy
3.00
1.33
960
Kosovo
4.96
2.65 1,295
Lithuania
2.44
1.15 2,109
Netherlands
2.33
1.30 1,845
Norway
2.75
2.75 1,624
Poland
3.48
5.14 1,898
Portugal
2.45
1.21 2,151
Russia
2.51
1.29 2,484
Serbia
2.59
1.35 1,847
Slovakia
2.80
1.42 1,847
Slovenia
3.32
4.09 1,257
Spain
3.18
3.22 1,889
Switzerland
2.74
1.34 1,493
Ukraine
2.76
2.28 2,178
Total
2.84
2.63 54,673

There are a few countries that have a relatively large average household size compared to
the overall European average (2.84). Compared to the average across all of Europe (2.84 members
per household), Albania (4.60), Israel (3.77), Iceland (3.47), Poland (3.48), Slovenia (3.32), and
9

Kosovo (4.96) have substantially larger families. The standard deviations of Albania (7.24),
Germany (4.07), Iceland (6.02), Poland (5.14), and Slovenia (4.09) are much greater than the
average standard deviation for the 29 countries sources of the data, suggesting a greater variability
in household size for those countries. Kosovo’s standard deviation (2.65) is not too far off from
the average standard deviation (2.63) for all of Europe, even though its average household size is
much higher. The countries with average household sizes smaller than the European average tend
to be the more traditionally liberal and democratic Western European countries (e.g., Great Britain,
France, Netherlands, etc.).

Structure of Families Across Present-day Europe
European countries also differ in the proportion of each category of individuals living in
the household. Western European countries tend to have fewer multi-generational and extended
family households, while Central Europe, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe have higher
proportions of these non-nuclear families. A few countries have significantly higher rates of multigenerational and extended family living. Looking at one case, Albania, we can see that 50% of the
individuals surveyed lived with children, 40% with parents, 22% with siblings, and 18% with other
relatives. Slovenia has also a high prevalence of multi-generational household, with 44% living
with children, 26% living with parents, 15% living with siblings, and 10% living with other
relatives. France is a quite dramatic contrast, with very low rates of living with parents, siblings,
and other relatives. Table 2 highlights the differences across Europe in family structure using the
ESS (2012) data.
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Table 2. Proportion of Relations in Households (ESS 2012)
Country
Albania
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech-Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Great Britain
Hungary
Ireland
Israel
Iceland
Italy
Kosovo
Lithuania
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Serbia
Slovenia
Slovakia
Spain
Switzerland
Ukraine
Average

Children
0.50
0.37
0.37
0.40
0.37
0.31
0.36
0.29
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.36
0.40
0.48
0.44
0.38
0.61
0.34
0.31
0.37
0.47
0.33
0.37
0.33
0.44
0.41
0.45
0.35
0.42
0.38

Parents
0.40
0.17
0.17
0.15
0.13
0.14
0.16
0.08
0.07
0.11
0.08
0.21
0.11
0.22
0.18
0.26
0.39
0.18
0.06
0.11
0.25
0.16
0.19
0.11
0.26
0.18
0.22
0.14
0.22
0.17

Siblings
0.22
0.12
0.04
0.09
0.08
0.08
0.07
0.05
0.04
0.08
0.05
0.08
0.08
0.18
0.13
0.16
0.23
0.06
0.04
0.08
0.13
0.08
0.07
0.08
0.15
0.09
0.13
0.11
0.07
0.09

Other
Relatives
0.18
0.02
0.08
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.07
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.06
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.25
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.10
0.06
0.09
0.01
0.10
0.05
0.06
0.01
0.10
0.05

Political Preferences Across Present-day Europe
It is important to note that the dataset consists of individuals from differing social, political,
and economic worlds. For each of the studies in this dissertation, the statistical models control for
these differences. To get a better grasp of how different the 29 countries contained in the ESS are,
11

I have added some descriptive statistics sourced from the ESS on the respective political
preferences and attitudes in all sampled countries. Using the ESS (2012) data, I calculated the
proportion of individuals within each country that either identifies as “left,” “center,” or “right” on
the political spectrum4. Table 3 displays the proportions of individuals in each country that identify
as “left,” “center,” or “right” on the political spectrum.

The left-right scale provided by the ESS is a 0 to 10 scale moving from “left” to “right.” Responses of “0,” “1,”
“2,” “3,” were coded as “left.” Responses of “4,” “5,” “6,” were coded as “center.” Responses of “7,” “8,” “9,” “10,”
were coded as “right.”
4

12

Table 3. Political Orientation Across Europe (ESS
2012)
Country
Left
Center
Right
Albania
0.29
0.35
0.37
Belgium
0.21
0.57
0.23
Bulgaria
0.23
0.49
0.28
Cyprus
0.27
0.42
0.31
Czech-Republic
0.24
0.46
0.30
Denmark
0.26
0.62
0.12
Estonia
0.13
0.60
0.27
Finland
0.13
0.51
0.36
France
0.27
0.45
0.28
Germany
0.23
0.41
0.36
Great Britain
0.17
0.62
0.20
Hungary
0.14
0.59
0.26
Ireland
0.14
0.64
0.21
Israel
0.18
0.36
0.46
Iceland
0.16
0.54
0.30
Italy
0.32
0.47
0.21
Kosovo
0.12
0.38
0.50
Lithuania
0.23
0.54
0.23
Netherlands
0.20
0.48
0.32
Norway
0.16
0.46
0.38
Poland
0.16
0.51
0.34
Portugal
0.22
0.55
0.22
Russia
0.14
0.63
0.23
Serbia
0.21
0.45
0.34
Slovenia
0.26
0.56
0.18
Slovakia
0.29
0.46
0.26
Spain
0.29
0.54
0.17
Switzerland
0.20
0.54
0.26
Ukraine
0.17
0.55
0.28
Average
0.21
0.51
0.28

Looking at the descriptive statistics, on average, about half of the respondents across
Europe indicate that they are politically moderate. This does not hold for all countries though.
Some countries have relatively few moderates (e.g., Albania, Cyprus, Kosovo), while others have
a relatively large number of moderates (e.g., > 60%: Denmark, Estonia, Great Britain, Ireland, and
Russia). These latter countries have fewer “left” or “right” leaning individuals.
13

Differences in history and political economy have produced large disparities across Europe
in institutional trust. Table 4 outlines the proportion of individuals in each country that either have
“little,” “some,” or “high” trust in their country’s parliament using the ESS (2012) data.

Table 4. Trust in Parliament Across
Europe (ESS 2012)
Country
Little Some High
Albania
59.61 22.54 17.85
Belgium
22.89 48.41 28.71
Bulgaria
71.44 23.64 4.92
Cyprus
48.35 39.47 12.18
Czech Republic
61.69 26.36 11.95
Denmark
30.39 44.44 25.17
Estonia
41.57 41.05 17.38
Finland
13.36 40.35 46.29
France
38 46.42 15.58
Germany
12.85 37.66 49.49
Great Britain
35.77 44.67 19.55
Hungary
45.34 34.9 19.76
Ireland
47.86 39.87 12.26
Israel
38.89 39.07 22.04
Iceland
36.92 43.38 19.69
Italy
52.96 36.31 10.73
Kosovo
61.33 27.41 11.26
Lithuania
55.73 35.31 8.96
Netherlands
17.4 51.57 31.03
Norway
10.4 37.87 51.73
Poland
60.44 31.88 7.68
Portugal
62.69 31.86 5.46
Russia
53.32 33.8 12.88
Serbia
13.93 37.88 48.19
Slovenia
58.01 31.79 10.2
Slovakia
58.1 31.57 10.33
Spain
50.56 37.41 12.03
Switzerland
9.58 42.87 47.55
Ukraine
76.89 18.61 4.51
Average
41 37.37 21.63
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Table 4 illustrates the large disparity in political trust across contemporary Europe. Some
countries, such as Germany (49.49%), Finland (46.29), and Norway (51.73%) have very high
levels of trust. Other countries have little to no trust: Bulgaria (71.44%), the Ukraine (76.89%),
and the Czech Republic (61.69%). Because of the large differences, it is important to include such
heterogeneity in the statistical modeling. All statistical models will include a random-intercept to
appropriately model the between-country variance. Social, political, and economic institutions
influence individuals’ behavior and decision-making. By including this type of statistical control,
we can isolate the influence that country-level differences (e.g., institutions, economics, etc.) have
on our questions of interest, thus, allowing to have a better understanding of the individual level
properties of choice, family size and structure.

Dissertation Question & Outline
Much of the previous research examining the influence of family on the social, political,
and economic world has focused heavily on finding associations between the most frequent family
forms within a region and its political and social institutions (e.g., Nuclear families co-vary with
liberal democracy in England). Little work has been conducted to investigate how family
organization drives changes to social and political institutions. As the family scales up in size and
encompasses different types of relations, a greater amount of time, energy, and resources would
need to be allocated to addressing the (diverse) needs of those within the family network. The
demands and constraints associated with such form of living profoundly influence how individuals
interpret, perceive, and prefer certain changes, outcomes, or modes of interacting.
This dissertation consists of three separate research articles each investigating a different
aspect of the development of conservative attitudes and preferences. Chapter 2 focuses on the
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preference for maintaining stability. Chapter 3 focuses on the desire for individual autonomy in
decision-making. Chapter 4 focuses on the perception of and ways of maintaining social
cohesiveness.

Chapter 2: Stability
Does a systematic relationship exist between features of family types and reluctance to
change? Living within a large, extended, or multi-generational family comes with distinct
opportunity costs. More resources must be allocated inward for the family, at the expense of
external activities or objective (i.e., social and human capital development). Individuals who
belong to a large family would be at a disadvantage in a world that is fast-changing. Successful
navigation of a fast-changing world requires an adaptable set of knowledge and skills. Reluctance
to accept a changing social, economic, and political world may be the result of an inability to easily
adapt to changing circumstances. I am first author on this article and Pierre Lienard is second
author. I wrote the article, conducted the analysis, and interpreted the results.

Chapter 3: Autonomy
Do we find evidence of psychological alignments with the specific demands associated
with living in particular types of families? Autonomy is typically understood as beneficial and
necessary for success in the modern economic world. This may be the case for certain groups of
people (e.g., young people), it may not be the optimal strategy throughout other stages in life. For
individuals starting a family, carrying the responsibilities of caring for a family or depending on
one, a strong desire for individual autonomy would not provide the correct incentives and
motivation for allocating resources appropriately (towards the family). In this study, we investigate
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how increased co-dependence (through family size), may modify individual psychologies so that
autonomy is less valued, eventually making resources allocation towards the family more certain.
I am first author on this article and Pierre Lienard is second author. I wrote the article, conducted
the analysis, and interpreted the results.

Chapter 4: Cohesiveness
Do individuals belonging to large families, which come with duties, responsibilities, and
resource allocation needs, prefer a more stable and cohesive social world? A social world with
high levels of cohesiveness can reduce social transaction costs, while providing the stability
necessary for engaging in long-term investments. Potential disruptions and changes to norms and
institutions that govern everyday interactions may reduce coordination and devalue the previous
investments individuals have made in the social world. Article 3 investigates whether family size
is related to perception of social cohesiveness, and what steps, if any, individuals are willing to
take to ensure that social cohesiveness is maintained. I am first author on this paper and Pierre
Lienard is second author. I wrote the article, conducted the analyses, and interpreted the results.
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Chapter 2 – For the Love of Tradition: How Family Morphology Predicts Reluctance to
Change

Abstract
Does a systematic relationship exist between morphological features of family types and
reluctance to change? We rely on data from the Round 6 (2012) of the European Social Survey to
test whether family morphological features are systematically associated with attitude toward
change. A random-intercept logistic regression model indicates that size of household, household
composition, and marital and parental statuses have significant effects on preference for stability,
as measured through attitudes toward traditions and customs. The degree of social and economic
mobility, as measured by age, income, and education level, significantly impacts preference for
stability too. Life in large and extended households comes with opportunity costs. Indeed,
kinfolks’ allocations of time and resource investments inward to sustain the large household
compete with alternative outward allocations. Hence, members of such large families are at a
disadvantage in a fast-changing world, which would require sustained time and resource
investments in human and social capital building to adapt to the transformed conditions. Such
individuals should generally display a preference for stability and a conservative attitude.

Introduction
“It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copybooks and by eminent people
when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking of what we are
doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilisation advances by extending the number of
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operations which we can perform without thinking about them.” (Medawar, 1984). Indeed, our
complex modern world demands that many everyday tasks be automatized or routinized, so that
attention might be reallocated to transactions with greater utility.
Imagine the act of making a purchase, a daily anodyne feat for most people in Western
democracies. That simple deed could not be achieved without complex systems of nested
institutions, and coordinated groups of people and organizations relying on task-routinization and
information-rich technologies. There is the bank branch, where the salary money was deposited,
and the ATM on the other side of town, where a withdrawal of cash is made. Let’s not forget the
teller from the shop – whom was never met before and probably will not be met again – who trusts
the money being handed over to him in exchange for a good that was held in store. Indeed, we
expect that one’s work will be paid and that money deposited in a bank will be available later. We
know that there is a low probability to be significantly cheated by shop owners and that generally,
paper (or plastic, for that matter) money is to be accepted at face value. Much of modern life
involves such complex social transactions in which people can habitually and routinely engage
thoughtlessly, thanks to the support of a complex set of formal and informal institutions and
organizations (North, 1990). Habits and routines facilitate social coordination while reducing the
cost of individual and collective decision-making, which could easily become prohibitive given
the complexity of our modern societies. The reliability and stability of institutions and
organizations vindicates prevailing habitual behaviors, hence making a wildly complex and highly
specialized world tamer and, to some extent, predictable.
The modification of acquired habits and developed routines is inherently costly, in time,
energy and cognition involved in the revision process. However, such revision has another more
dramatic consequence: the risk of disruption of webs of coordination that have been progressively
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weaved between large numbers of agents also acting habitually and routinely. By making longterm, higher-risk investments – such as deciding to have an additional offspring, investing in a
long job training instead of commencing a career immediately, specializing in a very specific trade
instead of favoring a broad training, and buying a house in a choice neighborhood – social agents
bet that most current coordination webs will endure in the future. Such risky investments could
easily fail were the economic, political and social conditions to rapidly change. Thus, in noncritical situations, maintaining the status quo has the partial advantage of limiting uncertainty,
permitting to act on the base of well-established expectations, and maintaining investmentpreserving coordinations (North, 1993). While offering many new economic and social
opportunities, modern-day, fast-reconfiguring societies increasingly demand greater flexibility of
adaption. Individuals faced with such a regularly transforming social, political and economic
environment may want to eschew the effortful accommodation to transitory novel situations,
adhering to what they conceive as tried-and-true solutions, hoping to protect important life
investments.
Social agents might be deterred from acquiescing to change because of idiosyncratic and
life-stage appropriate dispositions and preferences, or because of particular features of their current
coordination networks (Del Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015; Redfield, 1947). Dispositions
and preferences comprise such matter as variations in risk-taking and preference ranking, given
the individuals’ respective constitution, or in response to basic changes in their life trajectory and
status, or, more probably, a combination of the two. A young male might be more willing to take
great risks because he enjoys the thrill of being a daredevil, but also probably because he has not
had the opportunity to commit to long-term investments to the same extent as older males
(Dohmen, Falk, Golsteyn, Huffman, & Sunde, 2017). The latter might find a rapidly changing
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social world inconvenient given the potential dire costs that the situation might involve, the agents
being overall more committed, having less opportunity to acquire new knowledge or to train afresh
for a novel line of work. Disincentives to embrace change can also find their source in properties
of the organizational features of the family, the primary unit of social coordination (see Hajnal
(1965) for examples of disincentives). The particular form that a family assumes entails specific
patterns of coordination with binding investments (i.e., mutual duties, obligations and
responsibilities). Some familial arrangements may make it easier to respond to change (e.g.,
childless couple, nuclear family). Large multi-generational and extended familial households
typically presume dense internal networks of committed relations entailing many mutual
responsibilities and duties (Redfield, 1947; Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010; Alesina & Guiliano, 2013;
Alesina & Guiliano, 2010). It should be more complex for those families to rapidly rearrange their
internal configuration to address a fast-changing world. Furthermore, the internal demand for the
support of the welfare of the family and its members must significantly impede the flow of
investments that could be made available for the reconfiguration of the family’s insertion in the
broader social and economic world.
Reluctance to change can manifest itself in the preference for authoritarian politics (Jost,
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), a desire for a more protectionist economy (Mokyr, 1992),
and a greater social conservatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), all three, typical
of a traditionalist position rooted in a proclivity for customary patterns of behaviors and practices,
and established social and cultural values. Customary and traditional ways of interacting socially
have the advantage of reducing uncertainty, while boosting the predictability of the social world.
Individuals who do not have resources to react opportunistically to a fast-changing world should
find attractive a traditional world that would be perceived as more stable.
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Among other social indicators, being married (i.e., long-term life investment) and
belonging to an extended family (involving dense internal duties and responsibilities) should
engender preferences for a stable world. Those indicators should be decent predictors of attitude
to change, as measured through attitude toward traditions and customs. Individuals from large
families also tend to be less trusting of outsiders and exhibit more authoritarian characteristics
(Todd, 1985; Hajnal, 1965; Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010; Alesina & Giuliano, 2013; Alesina &
Giuliano, 2010). Given the constraints, responsibilities and investments associated with living in
larger households, their members should be more sensitive to disruptions of the established orders
and risks to current coordinations that such disruptions might afford.

Background
The reasons for the West’s social development and economic growth have been linked to
factors ranging from the spread of ideas (e.g., McCloskey, 2006; 2010; 2016) to the particulars of
geography and ecology (e.g., Diamond, 1997) to the adoption of specific institutional forms (e.g.,
North, 1990; Greif, 2006; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Hajnal (1965) and Todd (1985) have
extensively studied the role of one of those institutional forms – the family – for the West’s social
and political evolution. Both researchers have developed their respective classification of
European family forms on the basis of specific features such as living arrangements (e.g.,
authoritarian, permissive), size of household (e.g., nuclear, multi-generational/extended), number
of offspring, and female and male ages at marriage. Both scholars uncovered strong and longenduring correlations between family types, and social, political and economic conditions, which
has led to the thesis that the existing European family types might have been among the necessary
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conditions for the distinct sociopolitical systems now prevailing in 21th-century Europe (Hajnal,
1965; Todd, 1985; Todd, 1987; Todd, 1990).
Hajnal (1965; 1982) identified two major forms of families that have a long European
history: the Northwest Europe Simple Household (henceforth, NESH) or, the Joint Household
(henceforth, JoH). NESH is dominant in the Scandinavian countries (including Iceland, excluding
Finland), the British Isles, the Low Countries, the German-speaking areas, and northern France.
NESH is characterized by a late age at marriage for both sex, a sharing of household responsibilities
between husband and wife (i.e., egalitarian ethos), and the outside employment of unmarried
youngsters (hence, a greater freedom and independence for members of younger generations).
JoH, dominant in most European areas where NESH does not prevail, is characterized by an early
age at marriage and a hierarchically organized compound household under the authority of an older
couple.
NESH typically follows what has been termed the European Marriage Pattern (henceforth,
EMP) (Hajnal, 1982). EMP, which was first observed in the northern and western European upper
class, crystalized sometime during the 16th century. The significant number of individuals never
marrying is a major feature of EMP (Hajnal, 1982). The NESH late age at marriage combined with
the large number of individuals staying unmarried in EMP might have reduced the dissipation of
wealth through inheritance and facilitated the concentration of financial resources investable in
smaller familial units and, more crucially, in non-familistic investments (de Moor & van Zanden,
2010; van Zanden, 2011).
Hajnal (1965) discusses the plausible impact of NESH-EMP on the transformation of
European polities. The particular characteristics of those institutions would explain the economic,
social and political success of Northern and Western Europe (De Vries, 1994; De Vries, 2008;
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Carmichael & van Zanden, 2015; Carmichael, Dilli, & van Zanden, 2016). Indeed, the strong
association between economic expansion and improvement of the status of women (De Moor &
van Zanden, 2010), increased investments in human capital (van Zanden, 2011), and slowing down
of population growth (Foreman-Peck, 2011) in societies where NESH-EMP dominated suggests a
role of those institutions in the general advancement of Northwestern European polities. The
adoption of inclusive institutions, which was promoted by the egalitarian character of NESH, might
also have had an impact on development of economically advanced European regions (for a
discussion on inclusive institution see, Acemoglu & Robinson (2012)). The development of risksharing institutions, which are the hallmark of the modern economies, is also seen as contingent
upon the structure of NESH-like families (Greif, Iyigun, & Sasson, 2011). The link between family
structure and social, economic, and political outcomes seems to persist in modern-day Europe
(Duranton, Rodriguez-Pose, & Sandall, 2009). The investigation has been extended to nonEuropean countries. The effect that family structure has on economic, social, and political world
is evident in different sociopolitical and cultural contexts and across many countries and regions
of the world (Carmichael, Dilli, & van Zanden, 2016; Saito, 2000; Saito, 2011; Spijker & Esteve,
2011)
Following Hajnal’s work, Todd (1985; 1987; 1990) examined how family features shape
ideology and values. Todd’s European family morphological types are classified in four major
categories that were dominant in specific part of Europe throughout its history: absolute nuclear
(i.e., children once adults live in households independent from their parents’ and inheritance is
unequally distributed), egalitarian nuclear (i.e., independent households and equal division of
inheritance), stem (i.e., grandparents live with their firstborn son and his family, younger offspring
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move out, and inheritance is unequally distributed) and communitarian (i.e., grandparents live with
their children’s families and inheritance is equally distributed) (Todd, 1990).
Absolute and egalitarian nuclear are considered liberal family types, while stem and
communitarian are considered authoritarian. Absolute and egalitarian nuclear types foster
individualism, demand little adherence to tradition, and historically have been strongly associated
with the European regions where industrialization commenced early (England, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Norway, Northern France, Spain, North-Central Eastern Portugal, and Northern and
Southern Italy). Stem and communitarian families are hierarchical, are associated with a strong
adherence to tradition and have been a dominant family type in Germany, Sweden, Southern
France, Scotland, Belgium, Central Italy, Russia, China, Finland, central France, northern
Portugal, northern Spain, Central Italy. Without providing a clear model of transmission, Todd
(1985) proposed that individuals generally adopt the norms prevalent in their respective type of
socializing family: in stem and communitarian households, authoritarian; and in absolute and
egalitarian nuclear families, liberal norms.
Specific family types seem to be systematically associated with particular institutions and
behavioral norms. However, the expression of family values in the political sphere is a modern
phenomenon. Political ideology could be understood as the intellectual embodiment of family
values in the public sphere (Todd, 1985). Communitarian and stem family-dominated systems
would typically be more prone to embrace extreme corporatist forms of political expressions, such
as in a communist or fascist ideology, when economic or social disruptions dramatically affect
social order; absolute and egalitarian nuclear family-dominated systems would be more resistant
to such totalitarian temptations, given their members’ generally greater receptivity to liberal
ideologies (Todd, 1990). While a strong case is made for the association between family structure
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and political ideology, as much as for the process of intra-familial value transmission, Todd does
not provide a detailed mechanistic account of how familial norms and values get stabilized at
population levels.
A shift in family organization would likely bring about the rearrangement of mutual duties,
obligations and rights of its members. This might be critical to an understanding of drastic
transformations of economic, political and social institutions. Imagine a socially widespread
change in family organization that allows individuals to allocate more time to invest in
relationships with non-kin, and to delay marriage and starting a family. Such reduced family
opportunity cost would expand the scope of investment opportunities in outward-looking human
and social capital. However, that would only be possible to some extent in a world where external
institutional support progressively comes to guarantee that essential social functions previously
taken on by families be now progressively performed by third parties.
The particular clusters of features (e.g., number, identity and status of cohabitants) that
characterize family types are systematically associated (Hajnal, 1965; Todd, 1985), plausibly
because they maximize specific outcomes. These features influence the level of investment that
kin must make for being part of and sustaining their familial unit. Living with parents and
grandparents requires obedience, partial abdication of one’s autonomy for the sake of family
cohesion, and the channeling of major investments in time, resource and energy toward fulfilling
the needs of the household. Further, being in charge of a large household with many dependents
limits one’s ability to invest in social goals less immediately relevant to the family needs (Todd,
1985; van Zanden, 2014). Constraints and opportunities born out of the characteristics of the
family types modulate the choices and payoffs of the strategies pursued.
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When burdened with important familial constraints and demands, such as those engendered
by strong family ties, individuals should face greater difficulties to mobilize the necessary
resources to adapt to drastic changes in the organization of the economic, social and political
spheres. With fewer resources available and greater resistance from special interests (i.e., family
members), the re-allocation of resources to adapt to changing circumstances might become
increasingly burdensome. Defending the status quo and adopting a generally conservative stance
might become locally optimal strategies, as they have the added benefit of potentially protecting
long-term investments already made (e.g., a job, a skill set, or a social network). In this study we
take the construct of traditions and customs to be what is and has been stably known and practiced.
Regardless of how different individuals define tradition or custom, the common denominator of
customary and traditional practices, behaviors, or beliefs is that they have ben enduring and are
expected to last in the future. In other words, attitude toward traditions or customs is a proxy for
attitude toward uncertainty, predictability, and stability (Redfield, 1947). All else being equal,
tradition, as proxy for stability and predictability, should be found attractive by individuals who
have invested in long-term coordinations.

Current Study
Past research (e.g., Hajnal, 1965; Todd, 1985) has often reified the family types in its
explanation of their effect on social, economic and political evolution. Instead, to reach a more
refined understanding of the effect of family arrangements, it might be preferable to isolate the
degree of contribution of the particular features of the different family types to the preferences for
stability, as measured through the attitude toward traditions and customs.

27

Hypotheses
Greater familial responsibilities, as measured by marital status, and household size and
composition, predict a greater preference for embracing traditions and customs. Age (Dohmen,
Falk, Golsteyn, Huffman, & Sunde, 2017), income (Dwyer, Gilkeson, & List, 2002) and education
(Dwyer, Gilkeson, & List, 2002) might also play a role in promoting or reducing risk-taking
attitude. Individuals’ potential for social mobility, as measured by age, annual income, and years
of education should affect preference for traditions and customs.

Hypothesis 1: Greater family responsibilities, as measured by marital and parental statuses, and
household size and composition, increase the preference for traditions and
customs.
Hypothesis 2: Greater social mobility, as measured through age, income, and education, decreases
the preference for traditions and customs.

Data and methods
[1] Data: European Social Survey (Round 6, 2012)
Data of the Round 6 (2012) of the European Social Survey (henceforth, ESS) are used to
test the research hypotheses. ESS surveys public opinion about specific social, political, and
economic issues across 29 Western countries primarily located in Europe: Albania, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
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Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kosovo, Lithuania, Netherland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.
Fieldworkers collect the survey data in face-to-face interviews with participants who are 15 years
of age or above. The 2012 survey results were the latest and most comprehensive set of data
available at the time the present analysis was conducted.

[2] ESS Selected Dependent Variable: Importance of traditions & customs
Respondent are being asked to indicate on a scale from ‘1’ (“very much like me”) to ‘6’
(“Not like me at all”) how well the following statement describes their own attitude toward
traditions and customs: “Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow the customs
handed down by her/his religion or her/his family”.
To facilitate the statistical analyses, we generated a new dependent variable by collapsing
the multiple response categories into one of two dichotomous categories: (1) Respondents clearly
indicate that the statement describes them {1 & 2}, and (2) Respondents indicate that the statement
did not really describe them or did not describe them at all {3, 4, 5 & 6}. We chose to collapse the
response categories of the dependent variable in this manner to clearly delineate between a group
of individuals who have no doubt about the importance of customs and traditions (the staunchsupporter group) from a group of people who are either uncommitted or unconcerned (the
dilettante group). The dichotomous re-categorization qualifies the generic perception that social
agents have of the overall role that customs and traditions play in the social, political, and economic
spheres. Table 5 presents the original distributions; Table 6, the output after recoding.
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Table 5. Distribution of responses for
original dependent variable
Frequency Percentage
Very much like me
11,934
22.15%
Like me
17,221
31.96%
Somewhat like me
11,655
21.63%
A little like me
6,890
12.79%
Not like me
4,511
8.37%
Not like me at all
1,669
3.10%
Refusal
126
.0023%
Don’t know
472
.0086%
No answer
195
.0035%
Total
54,673
100.00%

Table 6. Distribution of responses for recoded
dependent variable
Frequency Percentage
Fully describes
29,155
54.11%
Does not fully
describe
24,725
45.89%
@
Total
53,880
100
@
List-wise deletion was applied when ESS indicated
that the respondent had refused to answer a
question, no knowledge of an appropriate answer or
not provided an answer.

[3] Independent variables: size, structure of family, number of offspring, marital status, and
gender
ESS provides comprehensive data on each respondent’s household and family structure.
Hajnal (1965) and Todd (1985) developed classifications of family types based on the specifics of
their respective morphology. Family types are just a classification tool; they do not cause anything,
but their component features might. We select essential features that are likely to have some effect,
given their impact on individuals’ time and resource investments. By doing so we hope to get a
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better understanding of how relevant aspects of families might have independent influences on an
individuals’ concern for stability.
ESS asks each respondent to list all individuals living in their household and their
respective relationship to him or her (i.e., husband, wife or partner; parent or parent-in-law; son,
daughter, step, adopted or foster, other relative, or other non-relative). One clear limitation of the
data is that ESS collapses relationship types together, thus not allowing for a fine-grained depiction
of a respondent’s household (e.g., children can be biological, step, adopted, or foster). We
generated three family-structure variables on the base of the ESS data: (1) Number of children in
the household (NoC), (2) Number of parents in the household (NoP), and, (3) Number of other
relatives in the household (NoR). Hence, together, NoC, NoP & NoR combine number and types
of relationships in the household and indirectly provide information about the type of familial unit
(e.g., multi-generational or extended). Non-relatives were not included as a variable in the model.
Living with non-relatives may indicate having housemates (e.g., living with friends).
We included two additional independent variables of interest in the statistical models: (4)
Marital status (MS) and (5) Gender (G). MS is a dichotomous variable, “1” being legally married,
and “0”, not legally married. G is coded as “1” for female and “0” for male.

[4] Control variables
Several control variables were included in the model: (1) respondent’s age in number of
years, (2) respondent’s education level in number of years, (3) respondent’s annual income as
percentile rank – categories are ranked 1 to 10 in deciles, and (4) respondent’s left-right political
orientation. The left-right scale is provided by the ESS as a 0-to-10 scale, asking respondents to
31

indicate where they politically stand on the left (0) to right (10) spectrum. Respondents were
collapsed on either one of two dichotomous variables on the base of their respective response: {0,
1, 2, or 3} were categorized as “left”; {7, 8, 9, or 10}, as “right”. Everyone else, the centrists,
received 0 for both dichotomous variables. Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics of the control
variables used in the model.

Table 7. Descriptive statistics (N = 45,487)
Variable
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of children
.663
1.021
0
10
Number of parents
.255
.6246
0
4
Number of other relatives
.0768
.437
0
13
Number of siblings
.133
.506
0
9
Married
.522
.500
0
1
Age
48.656
18.313
15 103
Ideology - Right
.278
.448
0
1
Ideology – Left
.205
.403
0
1
Years of education
12.784
4.008
0 51 †
Income (percentile rank)
5.191
2.808
1
10
Gender
.5268
.499
0
1
Importance of tradition/custom
.536
.499
0
1
Note: Descriptive statistics are for
all cases in the ESS.
† A relatively small number of respondents provided many years for
education. We removed some of the outlying cases and ran the model.
The outlying cases did not substantively or significantly modify model
results.

Method of analysis
Observations were removed when the participant had not provided responses for all
variables used in the model. List-wise deletion was applied when ESS indicated that the respondent
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had either (1) refused to answer a question, (2) not provided an answer, or (3) no knowledge of an
appropriate answer.
The dependent variable being dichotomous, we opted to run a logistic regression. Given
the heterogeneity of political, social, and economic conditions across Europe, a random-intercept
was included to account for country variance. Adding a country level in the statistical model allows
for a more precise estimation of individual-level coefficients. Country-specific characteristics
might impact individuals in particular ways. This needs to be accounted for statistically. At the
country level, the log of the GDP per capita and the country’s score on the Gini Index were
modeled as contextual variables. While GDP may not be the ideal indicator for measuring the
overall wealth or prosperity of individuals within a country, it is highly correlated with many
social, political, and economic country indicators (e.g., gender relations, corruption, institutional
stability, etc.) (Diebolt & Perrin, 2013; Mauro, 1995). The Gini Index score measures inequality
by measuring the dispersion of wealth in a country. GDP per capita and Gini values for the year
2012 were obtained from the World Bank database (as of November 2017). Both variables provide
a greater specification of the effect that living in a specific country may have on individuals’
preference for traditions and customs.
The multi-level logistic regression model is computed using the GLLAMM package in
Stata 14.1. Adaptive quadrature is used for estimating the model, as it offers greater computational
efficiency and precision (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, & Pickles, 2002; Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, &
Pickles, 2004). We specified 30 integration points when computing. ESS-provided sample weights,
to account for the unequal probability of selection, are included in the analysis at the individual
level.
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Results
All individual-level variables included in the model reached statistical significance. Female
respondents have 28% higher odds than male respondents, of thinking of themselves as persons
who hold that customs and traditions are important (p < .005). Marriage also plays a fairly large
role, with married respondents having 35% higher odds than unmarried respondents to find
traditions important (p < .005). The household-structure variables provide evidence that family
composition plays an essential role in determining the importance of customs and traditions for
the respondents. For each child living in the household we see a 9% increase in odds of finding
customs and traditions important (p < .005). Number of siblings had a larger effect. For every
sibling living in the household, there is a 13% increase in odds of strongly preferring tradition and
custom. Similarly, each new relative living in the household increases the odds by 7% (p < .01)
and every additional parent living in the household raises the odds by 7% (p < .05).
For the variables measuring social mobility, older respondents have higher odds of favoring
traditions and customs, with every additional year in age providing a 2% increase in odds (p <
.005). Education has an effect in the opposite direction. More education lowers odds of favoring
traditions and customs, with every year of schooling leading to a 4% decrease in odds (p < .005).
The effect of income was similar. For every decile increase in the respondent’s income, there was
an accompanying 4% decrease in odds of favoring traditions and customs (p < .01). Looking at the
variables for orientation on the left-right spectrum, individuals who placed themselves on the left
had 17% lower odds than centrists (p < .01), while those who placed themselves on the right had
38% higher odds than centrists (p < .001), of preferring to follow traditions and customs.
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Table 8. Random-intercept Logistic Regression (N = 37,514)
p
Odds-ratio [SE]
95% CI
Left Ideology
0.83 [0.05] **
0.74 - 0.93
Right Ideology
1.37 [0.06] *** 1.26 - 1.49
Age
1.02 [0.002] *** 1.02 - 1.02
Education
0.97 [0.01] *** 0.96 - 0.98
Income
0.96 [0.01] **
0.94 - 0.99
Gender
1.28 [0.07] *** 1.16 - 1.42
Marital Status
1.35 [0.06] *** 1.24 - 1.47
# of children
1.09 [0.02] *** 1.04 - 1.13
# of siblings
1.13 [0.03] *** 1.06 – 1.19
# of other relatives
1.07 [0.03] **
1.02 - 1.13
# of parents
1.07 [0.04] *
1.00 - 1.15
Country-level
GDP per capita (log)
0.78 [0.08] *
Gini Index Score
1.01 [0.02]
Variance (Residual)
.231 (0.06)
Note: Values in brackets are robust standard errors.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

.64 - .95
0.98 - 1.04

Discussion
[1] Overall findings
Family types, as constructed by Hajnal (1965) and Todd (1985), were broken down into
their main feature components – marital status, gender, and cohabitant types and number – to better
analyze the extent to which specific family characteristics exert an influence on the preference for
traditions and customs. All family-structure variables (marital status, offspring and cohabitation)
were significantly associated with having a greater preference for following traditions and
customs. The effects of the family morphological features are still significant, even after
controlling for other relevant factors, such as political orientation, GDP and Gini.
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Several variables contribute to the preference for traditions and customs – age, education,
and political beliefs – while not fully accounting for the formation of that preference. We show
that regardless of where someone positions oneself on the left-right political spectrum, family
structural features (marital status, offspring and cohabitation) still have a significant influence on
the preference for traditions and customs. Age is also significantly associated with preference for
traditions and customs, but its effect is not above and beyond the additive effect of family structural
features. Age matters, the older someone is, the more invested, and the greater the stakes involved
in a transformation of the social world will be. However, the age effect never reaches the level of
impact of being married and having offspring. Years of formal education and annual income do
matter (i.e., we observe decreasing odds of preferring traditions and customs when both income
and number of years of education increase). It should be expected: more education and income are
associated with greater degree of human and social capital, thus allowing for an enhanced social
mobility. However, the effects of education and income stay relatively small when compared to
our structural variables.
The statistical analysis identifies the impacts of several individual-level factors that
additively partially explain the preference for tradition and customs. Our model expands on
Hajnal’s and Todd’s insights in accounting for the social, economic, and political heterogeneity of
the European countries, thus reducing the left-over variance (now explained by country-level
properties) and allowing for a precise measure of the effect of family structural features on
preferences for traditions and customs. The ESS data are obtained from 29 countries with unique
and distinct social, economic, and political climates. Take for instance the striking differences that
exist between Germany and Kosovo (e.g., GDP, political regime, corruption). Economic, social or
political conditions beyond the ones retained for our model may push or pull individuals into
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making certain decisions. The country-level constraint guarantees that we partially control for
cultural heterogeneity. On the base of such a more robust analysis, we can propose that preference
for embracing tradition is not solely the product of country-level cultural differences or other more
specific types of variations in social organization and coordination, or income, education and
ideology. Preference for tradition is partially explained by the particulars of familial units.
Overall, these results suggest that attitudes stressing adherence to traditions and customs
emerge when people are faced with specific constraints. With greater long-term investments (e.g.,
in a marriage and in a family) come more conservative attitudes, independently of political views,
age, years of education, and income. The desire for stability to protect those long-term investments
might pull individuals toward being more conservative in their life.

[2] Social mobility
Age, education, and income serve as proxies for social mobility and are all significantly
associated with preference for tradition and customs. All else being equal, as individuals age, they
should increasingly prefer the status quo, as they are likely more invested into well-established
webs of coordination, the practice of well-rehearsed skills, and social habits and routines that
change could disrupt irredeemably. Older individuals typically have fewer available options for
reconversion into new functional roles departing dramatically from their core economic and social
activities. Thus, the older an individual becomes the less able he/she might be to respond
dynamically to novel conditions, which might explain the age effect on preference for traditions
and customs found in our study.
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Years of education and annual income are also negatively associated with a preference for
traditions and customs. An advanced educational training and a higher income provide means to
buffer against change-associated risks, which, in turn, would relax the requirement of a very stable
world for individuals socially and economically invested. Say, the company for which you work
decides to relocate elsewhere. With more disposable income, relocation is a manageable option,
as much as retraining or transposing your advanced skill and expertise set to another type of job.
In fact, in specific situations, individuals with more education and higher incomes might support
drastic social, political, and economic changes, as it could help in maximizing the economic return
of their knowledge, skills and talents. Groups of individuals that fall into this entrepreneurial
category may influence the spread of disruptive innovations (Olson, 1965).

[3] Family status and household structure
Marriage has a significant influence on the preference for traditions and customs. Married
respondents have 35% higher odds than unmarried ones, of embracing tradition and customs as
definitional of their identity, even after controlling for age, income, and education. Marriage is, in
essence, a bet on a long-term investment of time and resources in a particular relationship. Stability
generates confidence in long-term investments. Perceived instability jeopardizes the easy
assessment of future prospects, a suboptimal situation for individuals with long-term investments.
Married individuals face the constraint of having to compute payoff matrices that includes the
consequences of their choices for themselves but also for their long-term partner, hindering to
some extent fast, but riskier, adaptations to novel social or economic demands, hence potentially
making them less competitive on those market places. Stability guarantees that marriage-related
investments maintain their values.
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Gender has a significant effect on the preference for traditions and customs. Females have
28% higher odds than males, of preferring tradition. The difference between males and females
may be related to specific underlying reasons. Females are generally more risk-averse than males,
hence generally more conservative in their approach to life (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999).
Furthermore, females generally pay larger childrearing costs than males (Buss & Schmitt, 1993).
Highly dynamic economies with shifting social conditions may require individuals to relocate to
secure future economic opportunities. Relocation may prove difficult or unaffordable for entire
families, yet be a potential solution for some of their members. Economic migration may create a
greater risk for women, more likely to be left to shoulder the burden of childrearing and household
management (Antman, 2013). The increased risk of precarity that females might face following a
rapid economic shift is best illustrated by the examples of the introduction of a market economy
in the former Soviet states and the conditional opening of the European Union to new member
states over the past two decades, especially nations in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe.
Indeed, the expansion of the European common market has triggered large migratory fluxes from
Eastern Europe to Western Europe (Salt & Rees, 2006; Drinkwater, Eade, & Garapich, 2009).
Although remittance have provided benefits for the family members who remained in the home
countries, additional non-paid labor, such as household management, have been primarily taken
on by wives who stayed behind (Antman, 2013).
The total number of individuals in the household has a substantial effect on the preference
for traditions and customs. For every additional member living in the household, there is either a
7% (other relatives), 8% (children), 7% (parent), or 13% (sibling) increase in the odds of
preferring tradition. The difference between each type of relation makes sense in light of the
respective degree of relatedness of each category of cohabitants (Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama,
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1994). Other relatives, being the least related to ego of the three categories, as expected, demand
a lower contribution, while there is an antagonism in the hierarchical relationship with parents
(7% increase). Sibling has the largest effect (13% increase). Siblings are likely to be closely related,
while also moving through life in lockstep. This may engender greater incentive for stricter
coordination and, thus, adherence to norms. Children constitute an interesting case. While each
child added to the household only leads to an 8% increase in odds, the survey question does not
allow a precise determination of the degree of relatedness of household’s children with the
respondents. The category children might include children non-directly related to the respondent,
which would explain the depressed increase in odds.
When being a cohabitant in or in charge of a large household, attempting to preserve as
much as possible the status quo seems an appropriate strategy. Imagine a large family having to
relocate for economic reasons (e.g., job offer in a different city for one of the spouses). The spouse
accompanying the move might have to look for a new job in an unfamiliar environment. The
children will need to be transferred into new schools and will have to generate new friendships.
The family will have to switch from known social and support networks to new ones that must be
created. Hence, much of the previous investments made into building social capital, which
provided enduring benefits and security, will be eventually lost. The aggregate of all the costs
incurred by the members of the family makes it burdensome for a family to radically change its
existing social and economic arrangements, the bigger the family, the more so.

Limitations & Future Directions
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The ESS data set is a representative cross-sectional sample of ~54,000 participants from
across 29 countries in or around Europe. The large sample allows for more robust statistical
modeling, allowing for the inclusion of controls for country-level effects. This permits reaching a
greater precision when estimating the effect size of the independent variables. However, there is a
tradeoff to using cross-sectional data and the statistical modeling methods that we used. Although
a large data set to build statistically robust models, it does not allow a statistically categorical
identification of the direction of causality. Indeed, on the basis of the statistical model we cannot
definitively state that characteristics of the family cause greater adherence to tradition and custom.
It would be plausible to state that tradition and custom causes family size. The causal claim made
in this paper relies on the insights of Todd (1985; 1987) who suggested that ideology is the product
of family structure. Furthermore, our analysis includes individuals from all household positions
(i.e., grand-parents, parents, sons, daughters). The argument for reverse causation would be more
tenable if we were restricting our observations to the category of individuals who are heads or
creators of the household.
To make a strong causal argument, future researchers should consider experimental or,
possibly, longitudinal study designs. Both would allow for measuring change after an intervention
or over time. A properly controlled experimental design provides the most solid foundation for a
causal argument. There are also tradeoffs for that approach though. Following a cohort across time
is quite complex. Longitudinal studies face various problems, among which the mortality
confound. The experimental method is probably the most robust for identifying the direction of
causation between a set of variables. However, given the nature of the research about family
structures, building an experiment that is ecologically valid and generalizable poses substantial
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challenges. Additionally, recruiting participants that reflect average population segments, while
also recruiting sample large enough to properly specify the statistical models might prove difficult.

Conclusion
Past research has highlighted the variation in family morphology around the world and
Europe. A systematic association has been found between certain types of families and social
systems, and to some extent, economic success (Hajnal, 1965; Todd, 1985). It seems that some
family forms would be optimally suited for the modern world with its major features of speed of
innovation, and regular economic revolution and social reconfiguration. The long-term investment
requirements associated with marital and large household living come with opportunity costs. The
sustained investments in energy, time, and resource towards one’s spouse and extended family
may limit venturing intensively into building more human and social capitals that could be
strategic to dealing with a fast-transforming world. When exposed to such marital and familial
constraints, preferring the status quo to changing conditions is rational. Indeed, the status quo
inherently reduces uncertainty. However, it also disincentivizes some risk-taking that could lead
to the uncovering of new social and economic opportunities.
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Chapter 3 – Free to Choose: The Influence of Marital Status and Family Size on The
Preference for Individual Autonomy

Abstract
Individuals move through life stages that entail distinct investments and responsibilities.
Prosperous agents adapt to the new demands of stage-specific life-history changes. Establishing a
stable partnership and starting a family are pivotal and transformative ventures that come with
tradeoffs, such as a certain loss of decisional autonomy for a boost in affective and social support.
Families come in typical distinct forms (e.g., nuclear, multi-generational, extended, etc.), each
entailing their own respective investments, arrangements, constraints, and opportunity costs. Do
we find evidence of a psychological alignment with the specific demands associated with living in
particular types of families? Might an increase in co-dependence between family members or
partners in a couple come with a lowering of the preference for individual autonomy? Relying on
data provided by the European Social Survey (2012), we test whether household size, marital
status, and gender impact the preference for individual autonomy and freedom in decision-making.
A random-intercept logistic regression model shows that the selected household and family
characteristics have significant effects on the fostering of a preference for individual autonomy.
This effect is independent of other relevant factors, including age, income, years of education and
perceived actual individual autonomy. Married individuals and members of large families indeed
face specific constraints that seem to render individual autonomy less attractive for them. We
propose an explanation for why that would be the case.
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Introduction
The educated, mobile, enterprising, autonomous and self-sufficient individual is a
stereotype strongly emphasized in the consumerist culture of our modern societies. Is this an
adequate reflection of the on-the-ground reality? Partially, for some, but it does not apply for most
people, most of their life. Thanks to the dense institutional framework of our modern societies,
ambitious, educated and still-unattached individuals can enjoy many benefits that our fast-evolving
modern world affords. New altered circumstances, such as changes in marital or family status,
might motivate individuals to rearrange their priorities and ranking of preferences, which might
eventually have dramatic consequences for individuals’ mobility and ability to quickly adapt to
new economic and social opportunities.
Individuals must balance their finite budgets of resources such as energy, time, and human
and social capitals, while pursuing their social and economic aims of choice (Hill & Kaplan, 1999).
Allocation of finite resources entails tradeoffs between competing options. Consider pursuing a
higher education, which involves a tradeoff between more precarious conditions now – i.e., lower
earnings for a substantial number of years and, maybe, less socializing (for a studious student!) –
for a (hopefully) boosted income, and a greater economic freedom and stability later. It may be
strategic for a young college-bound Westerner to put an extreme premium on his/her autonomy,
hence potentially maximizing some of the benefits afforded by the stage of life in which he/she
finds herself. Would it be so for a parent of three committed to his/her familial investment?
Our study focuses on the extent to which human psychology (i.e., preferences) aligns with
the constraints associated with investing and living in a stable partnership and a family. The
successful transition from being a singleton to being a member of a partnership who actively
contributes to the provisioning of a family-unit introduces new constraints on preferences and
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behaviors. Furthermore, as the family-unit scales up with each novel addition, so do familial
obligations, and responsibilities. The resource burden can reach substantial levels. Familial duties
typically compete with immediate personal investments in human or social capital building
endeavors (e.g., Alesina & Giuliano, 2013; de Moor & van Zanden, 2010; Ermisch & Gambetta,
2010; Foreman-Peck, 2011; Greif & Tabellini, 2010, Hajnal, 1965; Todd, 1985; Todd, 1987).
Human psychology is designed to deal with the specific and changing constraints and
demands humans face throughout their life (Hill & Kaplan, 1999; Johns & Belsky, 2007; Giudice,
Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015). We ordinarily embrace the new responsibilities that spring out of the
new arrangements in our lives (Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015). We weigh the payoffs of
competing choices and risks; those processes, notably implicit, contribute to the regulation of our
behaviors (Tooby et al., 2008). Such computations are individual-specific, sensitive to the agent’s
status and conditions (Lienard, 2011). Preference rankings get recalibrated and updated on the
basis of internal changes (e.g., aging), changes in the surrounding environment (e.g.,
predictability), and changes in life circumstances (Dohmen, et al., 2017; Giudice, Gangestad, &
Kaplan, 2015; McDermott, Fowler, & Smirnov, 2008; Daly & Wilson, 2005; Griskevicius, Tybur,
Delton, & Robertson, 2011).
A significant psychological shift occurs when one initiates a long-term relationship or, even
more so, one becomes a parent (Buss & Schmitt, 1990; Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015). In
such cases of life history-specific familial changes, resources must be reallocated from what were
primarily self-indulgent hedonistic pursuits to the sustained relationship or the caretaking of
offspring. Preferences should be reordered, which eventually lead to the acceptance of constraints
that were thought as unimaginable previously, such as losing sleep during the early stages of
childrearing and sticking with an unfulfilling job because it supports the family. This dilemma is
45

not restricted to parents – individuals living with a family that welcome a new baby, would also
experience important reshuffling of his/her preferences, as tradeoffs between individual wants and
novel family accommodations are computed. For someone living in or having charge of a family,
fully committing to a strategy of maximizing his or her autonomy has consequences. Adopting
such strategy potentially disrupts family coordination leading to retaliation by other family
members (e.g., shunning, ostracizing, unwillingness to provide support), which could eventually
provoke the dissolution of the familial unit.
Generally, most people feel closely bound to the significant investments that they have
made and care about maintaining them, even if the resources required for the maintenance would
eventually far outweigh the expected returns from redirecting the resource allocation away from
such investments (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Zeelenberg & van Dijk,
1997). We observe such behavior in various domains of activity. Arkes and Blumer (1985)
highlight the tendency for companies to continue investing in projects with large attached sunk
costs, despite evidence that those projects might not be profitable any longer. In hindsight human
cognition might appear error-prone and irrational. However, the (at-time exorbitant) pull of sunk
costs on decision-making might best be explained in the framework of human life history theory,
in light of the evolutionary-relevant decisional ecology of our species (i.e., see: Goldstein &
Gigerenzer, 2002).
Having to make long-term, expensive, and resource-intensive (i.e., costly) investments is
a significant aspect of our species’ life history. Those investments typically take years to come to
full fruition. Humans spend an extensive period of their life in a pre-reproductive phase, dependent
to various degrees on others for their survival, a relatively rare characteristic in the animal world
(Bogin 1999; Hrdy 2009; Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan 2015). Raising children to full
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independence demands much effort and reallocation of resources towards dependents for close to
two decades (Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000). The evolutionary cost of a failed
reproduction is thus significantly high (Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000). This is
especially true for females who pay a larger evolutionary cost if reproduction were to fail, given,
among other things, females’ narrower window of fertility, cost of gestation and greater
involvement in early caretaking (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Geary 1998; Low 2015).
Reallocation of resources and changes in preferences are disruptive. Our psychology has
been designed to ensure that, on average, we find the necessary motivation to sustain our
preference reorganization by providing various emotional benefits. We find immense pleasure and
satisfaction in family-based activities and obligations. We are endowed with the capacity to feel
love for our offspring or our long-term partner. To varying degrees, we feel responsible for the
welfare of our children, siblings and parents (for a discussion on emotion as motivation for
regulating behavior, see: Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Frank, 1988; Nesse, 1990). And we feel guilty
when we divert precious familial resources to inappropriate pursuits. The timing of divorce is
edifying in some respect. The unraveling of matrimonial unions is more likely to occur around
transitional stages in the offspring’s life trajectory (e.g., end of infancy, beginning of childhood,
beginning of adolescence, end of adolescence, etc.) (Gottman & Levenson, 2000; Steinberg &
Silverberg, 1987; DeMaris & Rao, 1992; White & Booth, 1985). During these transitional phases,
while the constraints from the previous stage are progressively relaxed, reconfigurations of
resource allocation are free to occur, at times back toward more selfish personal objectives.
This study aims at better understanding the influence that the specific costly and long-term
investments associated with living with partners and families have on the preference for individual
autonomy. When resources are being directed towards supporting the family, in proportion to its
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size, does the size of one’s investment in family matters impact the value placed on individual
autonomy? Using the European Social Survey (2012), we test whether specific features of the
family and household, namely, size of family living in the household and marital status of the
respondent, influence the premium that individuals place on freedom of choice and autonomy.

Background
Life History and Family Institution
All organisms need to allocate finite stores of resources between competing objectives,
tasks and activities. At different stages in an organism’s life history, allocation strategies should
differ, and certain activities should be prioritized if that organism is to address the gender-, ageand status-specific challenges being faced (Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015). Newborn babies
rely on different allocation strategies from teenagers (i.e., demanding support while growing a
brain versus demanding an increased independence in order to grow a personal peer network).
Adults with and without children must engage in different allocation strategies (i.e., caretaking
versus seeking out short- or long-term partners). An optimal stage-specific strategy must take into
consideration numerous factors, among which are included: (1) the specific environmental
conditions, (2) the availability of resources, and (3) the particular level of uncertainty (Brumbach,
Figueredo, & Ellis, 2009; Ellis, Figueredo, Brumbach, & Schlomer, 2009; Griskevicius, Tybur,
Delton, & Robertson, 2011). Allocation strategies vary between individuals and populations, as
the optimal tradeoffs are conditional upon dispositional and circumstantial variations.
Life history stages are biologically and behaviorally distinct. Our psychology has been
fine-tuned to address the challenges that we are likely to face at different life history stages
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(Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015). We should expect and do see changes to characteristics of
personality, preferences, and behaviors across the life course (Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, &
Robertson, 2011; Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015; Dohmen, et al., 2017). Risk-tolerance is a
good illustration. Infants need to secure the attention of caretaker. They have various way of
eliciting care from an adult (e.g., crying, smiling). Abrupt changes of conditions should trigger
bursts of signaling on the part of infants given her general altriciality. Young adult males signal
their assets to potential mates through risky and, seemingly, irrational behavior (for the concept of
costly signals, see Zahavi & Zahavi, 1999; for examples, see: Griskevicius, 2007). At specific life
history stages, as seen in these examples, resources are allocated to certain activities (in this case,
crying or displaying mate value), to secure a specific resource and/or benefit (care and mating
opportunity) consonantly with the agents’ respective risk tolerance level.
The range of observable strategies on the mating market can illustrate the dynamic shifts
that occur in activity prioritization and resource allocation. Acquiring a mate involves specific
psychologies that motivates individuals to display their potential partner’s qualities and to assess
mates’ potentials, both gender-specific in their respective deployment (Buss & Schmitt, 1993;
Krebs & Dawkins, 1978). After pairing, mate-guarding and mate-keeping, which ensure that the
investment in a partner is not wasted, trigger specific affective responses such as jealousy, the
desire to spend time with the desired one, or the impulse to signal attachment by spending
resources on that other (Buss, 1988; Wilson & Daly, 1992). When taking on the responsibilities of
maintaining and sustaining a relationship or marriage, risk-taking activities should be dampened.
Engaging in risky behaviors is contingent upon circumstance and the anticipated payoffs given
these circumstances (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; McDermott,
Fowler, & Smirnov, 2008). Individuals in unstable environments pursuing short-term strategies
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(i.e., when the future is uncertain and time horizons are shorter) may find risk more profitable,
given their baseline expectations about the world (Ellis et al., 2012; Daly & Wilson; Griskevicius,
Tybur, Delton, & Robertson, 2011; White, Li, Griskevicus, Neuberg, & Kenrick, 2013). Marriage,
however, constitutes a long-term strategy, which requires delaying immediate self-gratifying
benefits for long-term gains (Ellis et al., 2012). Indeed, married individuals seem to be less likely
to take financial risks and to engage in wasteful spending (Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, & Jonker,
2002; Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Sunden & Surette, 1998).
A particular subset of individuals, specifically, those with familial dependents, should
exhibit greater risk aversion and be more conservative in their decision-making. Rewards with a
low probability of occurring should no longer be found attractive, as the agent’s time horizon
expands (Daly & Wilson, 2005a). Imagine the typical scenario of male-male competition:
punishing a rival can produce immense short-term gains (e.g., respect among conspecifics, honest
and effective advertising to the opposite sex or other rivals, etc.), but there are long-term potential
downsides: extended feuding and other negative repercussions such as shunning, social avoidance,
and loss of status or prestige. All potential results could eventually have an impact on future longterm investments, were the individuals looking to engage in such novel strategy. Indeed, pursuing
a long-term strategy (e.g., marriage and family) demands that self-gratification (i.e., benefits in the
short-term) and future oriented behavior be weighted differentially. For investment taking long
periods to come to fruition, it pays handsomely to follow strategies that reduce risk overall.
Increasing tolerance to delays or other inconveniences increases the likelihood to see adaptive
strategies being adopted too. Choices that could dramatically alter the status quo should be
definitively tagged as less attractive. In the previous example, defeating a rival may be profitable
for the young man with few dependents (it may lead to status gain), but for someone who has a
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network of kin who depend on him and to which he is committed, it may be ideal to behave less
aggressively and more cooperatively toward others, as aggression and impulsivity may
dramatically destabilize social coordination, which could then jeopardize the safety of his familial
investment.
Modifying preferences so that resources are redirected to fulfilling family needs is a crucial
component to our species’ success. The systematic transfer of resources across generations and
between family members supports and sustains us through extended periods of dependence
(Gurven, Stieglitz, Hooper, & Gomes, & Kaplan, 2012; Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015).
Given how essential families are, we can expect that human psychology be endowed with a suite
of evolved mechanisms (and associated motivated behaviors) designed to solve kin-related
adaptive problems. Indeed, we have the ability to construct and understand kin relations (e.g., kin
psychology; Jones, 2003; Daly & Wilson 2005b, Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2007; Park,
Schaller, & van Vugt, 2008; Lieberman, Oum, & Kurzban, 2008). We care for the welfare of
family members and take it into consideration when making decisions (van Schaik & Buckart,
2010; Fessler & Gervais, 2010). We probably are endowed with mechanisms enabling, to some
extent, the complex assessment of the likely consequences of typical familial investments and the
demands associated to their preservation (for a discussion on the role of human life history and
cooperative breeding in shaping human cognitive abilities, see: Burkart, Hrdy, & van Schaik, 2009;
Burkart & van Schaik, 2009; van Schaik & Burkart, 2010). Motivations and dispositions should
facilitate downgrading choices that threaten such long-term investments. Even children, in
general, do get to the point where they understand that insisting further would be too deleterious
for themselves, and for their family (see, for example, the question of parent-offspring conflict in
Trivers, 1974 and Schlomer, Del Giudice, & Ellis, 2011). Pursuing a strategy of maximizing
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autonomy may open new opportunities, but it can also impact existing costly long-term
investments, thus it may not be optimal to pursue at all life stages. Is there any re-ranking of
preferences, as we should expect if our psychology was to be endowed with a suite of adaptations
dedicated to maximizing long-term familial investment?

Current Study
Family life is made possible thanks to sustained investments. Individuals have duties,
obligations, and responsibilities towards their spouse or kin whose fulfillment can possibly come
at the expense of the individuals’ immediate interests. Tradeoffs must be made to adequately invest
in the welfare of family members. Thus, to some extent, family investments (e.g., marriage, cohabitation etc.) require that an individual concede some of his/her immediate personal interests for
the benefit of his/her partner or kin. Current investments influence decision-making. As such,
constraints associated with family life should constrain individual autonomy. As psychology aligns
with the circumstances of one’s life, desire for an unadulterated autonomy should be downplayed
in order to prioritize alternative family-friendly aspirations, desires and preferences. Do
individuals from large households devalue the importance of individual autonomy? In the
following study, we test whether family and household investment, as measured by size of
household and marital status, are associated with lower preference for autonomy in decisionmaking. The research relies on individual-level survey data from across 29 countries, while
accounting for between-country differences. This will more effectively and precisely allow us to
understand the effect that family structure has on individual autonomy regardless of the differences
in human capital, institutional capacity, and cultural systems.

52

Hypothesis 1: Married individuals will attach less importance to autonomy than unmarried
individuals.

Hypothesis 2: As the size of one’s household increases, the importance attached by individuals to
autonomy decreases.

Data and Methods
Data – European Social Survey (Round 6, 2012)
Data for the analysis are sourced from the European Social Survey (Round 6, 2012). The
European Social Survey assesses public opinion patterns and changes on various social, political,
and economic issues across 29 countries in and around Europe. 5 The data are collected by teams
of fieldworkers in face-to-face interviews. Respondents are at least 15 years old. The 2012 survey
results are the latest and most comprehensive set of data available for analysis.

Dependent Variable
The European Social Survey asks respondents to indicate how much the following
statement reflects their own views, “It is important to her/him to make her/his own decisions about

5

The European Social Survey comprises individual-level data from 29 countries: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kosovo,
Lithuania, Netherland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.
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what she/he does. She/he likes to be free and not depend on others.” This question is measured
using an ordinal scale. Respondents indicate on a 1 to 6 scale, “1” being “Very much like me” and
“6” being “Not like me at all”, how well the following statement describes them: “It is important
to make own decisions and be free.”
To ease interpretability, a dichotomous variable was generated by collapsing multiple
categories of the dependent variable together. The two categories split individuals who consider
that the statement fully describes them (i.e., strong preference for individual autonomy) from
individuals who consider that the statement does not fully describe them. The objective of recoding
was to generate a dependent variable that was strict in its classification of the respondent pool.
Collapsing the categories of the original dependent variable clearly delineates two groups of
individuals who think that either the statement describes them fully [“Very much like me” and
“Like me”], or that it only describes them partially or not at all. Table 9 presents the distributions
of the question and its response options provided by the ESS. Table 10 presents the recoded
dichotomous dependent variable.
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Table 9. Distribution of responses for original
variable6
Category
Frequency Percentage
Very much like me
16,280
29.78
Like me
20,954
38.33
Somewhat like me
10,228
18.71
A little like me
4,254
7.78
Not like me
1,751
3.20
Not like me at all
421
0.77
Refusal
116
0.21
Don’t know
484
0.89
No answer
185
0.34
Total
54,673
100

Table 10. Distribution of responses for recoded
dependent variable
Frequency Percentage
Fully describes me
37,234
68.10
Does not fully describe me
17,439
31.90
Total
54,673
100

Key Independent Variables
The independent variables of interest are the respondent’s family and household
characteristics. The ESS contains a large selection of demographic questions to provide context
and background on each respondent. Comprehensive data on household structure are made
available. ESS contains a variable measuring household size, which includes potential nonrelatives (e.g., roommates) for whom different set of obligations from the ones existing between
kin prevail. We are specifically interested in isolating the impact of familial investment on our
dependent variable. Hence, we generated a new variable excluding co-habitant non-kin, on the

6

Descriptive statistics contain all observations
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basis of household structure data available in ESS. In order to do so, we simply summed up the
number of spouses, parents, children, siblings, and other relatives living as regular members of the
household, to become our variable family size.
We included in the statistical model other independent variables of interest about the
respondent’s membership status in the family. The marital status of the respondent, coded as “1”
if he/she is legally married and “0” if not legally married. And the respondent’s gender, which is
coded as “1” if female and “0” if male.

Control variables
The model also includes several control variables relevant for the proper evaluation of the
importance of autonomy and freedom in decision-making for an individual. They include: 1) the
respondent’s age in number of years, 2) the respondent’s years of education, 3) the respondent’s
annual income as percentile rank (categories are ranked 1 to 10 in deciles), and 4) the respondent’s
political orientation on the left-right scale. The left-right scale is provided by the ESS as a 0-to-10
ordinal scale. Respondents must indicate where they stand, with the maximum on the left being a
“0” and the maximum on the right being a “10”. Two dichotomous variables were generated to
represent having either a left or right leaning political orientation. Those who responded 0, 1, 2, or
3 were categorized as belonging to the “left”, while those who responded 7, 8, 9, or 10 were
categorized as “right”. The ‘centrists’ were given 0s for both dichotomous variables.
One last control variable was added to the model. ESS respondents are asked to indicate
how much they agree (5-point scale, “Agree strongly” to “Disagree strongly”) with the following
statement, “I am free to decide how to live my life”. We included this variable to control for a
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possible confounding factor, time. Members of larger households may simply not have the time to
decide for themselves, given the concentration of duties, obligations, and responsibilities towards
the other co-habitants. By including this variable into the model, we better account for the variance
explained by family life’s constraint on individuals’ time allocation, allowing at the same time for
a more accurate and more precise measure of family size and membership status’ influence on
preference for individual autonomy. See Table 11 for descriptive statistics of the variables used in
the model.
Table 11. Descriptive statistics (N = 54,673)
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev. Min Max
Family size
1.75
1.50
0
23
Individual autonomy (actual)
1.99
.90
1
5
Married
.50
.50
0
1
Age
48.30
18.60
15
103
Ideology - Right
.24
.42
0
1
Ideology – Left
.17
.38
0
1
Years of education
12.54
4.02
0
51
Income (percentile rank)
5.06
2.81
1
10
Gender
.54
.50
0
1
Individual autonomy (value)
.69
.46
0
1

Method of Analysis
Observations were removed if they did not provide responses for all variables retained in
the model, using list-wise deletion. There are several reasons for why a response was not provided.
The respondent either: 1) refused to answer a question, 2) did not provide an answer, or 3) did not
know what their answer was.
Recoding the dependent variable from an ordinal scale to a dichotomous scale allows
relying on a logistic regression for our analysis. Given the heterogeneity of political, social and
economic conditions across European countries, a random-intercept was included to account for
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country-level variance. Modeling the country level allows for more precise estimation of
individual-level coefficients. At the country-level, the log of the GDP per capita and the country’s
score on the Gini index were modeled as contextual variables7. Both variables provide a measure
of the effect that country-level disparities in GDP per capita and inequality have on the selected
dependent variable. GDP per capita is an appropriate proxy for several other socio-political and
economic measures with which it is highly correlated. Specifically, GDP can serve as a proxy and
be used to assess general country-specific quality of life across multiple domains, such as: gender
relations, political stability, and corruption (Diebolt & Perrin, 2013; Mauro, 1995).
The multi-level logistic regression model was computed using the GLLAMM package of
Stata 14.1 software. Adaptive quadrature was also used for estimating the model, as it offered
greater computational efficiency and precision with 30 integration points specified (Rabe-Hesketh,
Skrondal, & Pickles, 2002; Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, & Pickles, 2004). Sample weights provided
by the ESS to account for unequal probability of selection were included in the analysis at the
individual-level.

Results
The random-intercept logistic regression model results indicate that all the independent
variables of interest (Marital status, gender, and household size) are significantly associated with
the preference for individual autonomy. Table 12 displays the results for three separate models.
The first model contains only the independent variables of interest (Marital status, gender, and
household size). The second model includes nearly all covariates, besides the perceived ability to

7

GDP per capita and Gini values for the year 2012 were obtained from the World Bank database.

58

make decisions. And the third one is the full model, which includes all covariates at both the
individual and country levels. The discussion focuses on what was found in the final full model,
while referring to the two preliminary models for comparison.
Each unit increase in size of family leads to a 7% decrease in the odds of preferring
individual autonomy (p < .005). Being married has a large impact on identifying as someone who
values individual autonomy, with married individuals having 26% lower odds of identifying as
such (p < .005). Females have 10% lower odds than males, of identifying as someone who values
individual autonomy (p < .05). A few of the control variables have a significant effect on the
preference for autonomy. For every increase in decile of income, there is an accompanying 4%
increase in the odds of finding individual autonomy important; for every year of education
completed, there is a 4% increase in such odds (p < .005). We controlled for the perception of
autonomy using an additional question from the ESS, “I am free to decide how to live my life.”
That perceived ability to make your own choices has a large and significant effect on the preference
for autonomy; every unit decrease in level of agreement is associated with a 33% decrease in the
odds of finding individual autonomy important (p < .005). While this effect is large, it does not
have a large influence on the other variables in the model, as the other independent variables of
interest did not lose significance or have their effects modified substantively once that variable
was introduced in the full model. Level of income inequality and wealth of the country where the
respondent resides were not significant, as neither GINI score or GDP per capita contributed
significantly to developing a preference for individual autonomy.
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Table 12. Model Results Random-intercept
Logistic Regression
Odds-ratio [SE]
No Covariates (N = 45,688)
.87 [.037] **
Marital status
.74 [.030] ***
Gender
.96 [.014]
Family size
*
Country level
Variance (residual)

95% CI
.80 - .94
.68 - .80
.93 - .99

.23 (.058)

Covariates (N = 37,663)
Age
Education
Income
Ideology – Left
Ideology – Right
Gender
Married
Family size

0.99 [.002]
1.04 [.007] ***
1.04 [.012] **
1.05 [.042]
1.14 [.049] **
0.89 [.040]
*
0.73 [.035] ***
0.92 [.016] ***

Country-level
GDP Per Capita (Log)
Gini Index Score
Variance (Residual)

.97 [.12]
.99 [.020]
0.25 [.057]

.76 - 1.23
.96 – 1.03

0.998 [.001]
1.04 [.006]
1.03 [.012]
1.07 [.044]
1.12 [.048]
0.90 [.036]
0.74 [.036]
0.93 [.015]
0.67 [.016]

.995 - 1.001
1.03 - 1.05
1.01 - 1.05
.98 - 1.15
1.02 - 1.21
.84 - .98
.67 - .81
.90 - .96
.64 - .70

Full Model (N = 37,588)
Age
Education
Income
Ideology – Left
Ideology – Right
Gender
Married
Family size
Perceived Actual Autonomy

***
**
**
*
***
***
***

Country-level
GDP Per Capita (Log)
.96 [.110]
Gini Index Score
.998 [.020]
Variance (Residual)
0.24 [.052]
Note: Values in brackets are robust standard errors.
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.995 - 1.00
1.02 - 1.05
1.01 - 1.06
.97 - 1.14
1.05 - 1.25
.81 - .97
.66 - .80
.89 - .95

.76 – 1.20
.96 – 1.04

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005

Discussion
Overall Findings
Our analysis identifies that the marital status of someone and the size of the household in
which he or she lives contribute to the development of a preference for individual autonomy. That
observation holds even when controlling for age, years of education, annual income, political
orientation, and actual perceived autonomy. Controlling for the between-country differences has
allowed to strengthen further the results of the statistical model. The ESS surveys individuals from
29 countries throughout Europe. The data comes from places with striking differences in standard
of living, values and beliefs, behavioral norms, and political institutions. Several control variables
were included to account for additional potentially relevant factors (e.g., annual income, age, etc.).
Those variables can only partially provide appropriate controls for the selected statistical model.
They may behave at times quite differently in the various countries surveyed. For an illustration
of the problem, take ‘years of education’. Its effect depends on the average years of education of
each country. In some countries, 12 years might be the norm, while in other cases, education is
limited to elementary and some secondary programs. These country-level differences might blur
the estimation of the effect of the individual-level variables. Accounting for cultural and
institutional heterogeneity among the 29 countries allows for a greater precision in the individuallevel variable estimation. Family size and marital status have significant effects on preference for
individual autonomy, even when we take into consideration the differences between countries.
The results suggest that an alignment of individuals’ psychology and preferences with the
realities of family life might occur. When autonomy is available and affordable, desiring it should
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not be problematic. Indeed, an autonomy maximizing strategy can be of great benefit for those at
the appropriate life history stage (e.g., young adulthood). Increased autonomy generates
opportunities otherwise unattainable, leading to increased benefits associated with social and
human capital acquisition. On the contrary, when autonomy risks being detrimental, when it may
risk destabilizing costly (longer-term) investments, it may not be as desirable. For someone with
a dense web of social and familial connections, pursuing an autonomy maximizing strategy, while
not taking the welfare of those around into consideration would imply shirking responsibilities and
duties. In such a case, a strong desire for autonomy could become expensive. Downgrading the
value of autonomy helps in the motivation of the agent to reallocate resources and to reprioritize
tasks and activities fulfilling familial responsibilities.

Perceived Actual Individual Autonomy
The dependent variable in our model was how valuable individuals found autonomy to be.
It may be that the degree to which individuals value autonomy is dependent on how much
autonomy they actually have in their life. For example, if I have little autonomy in my day-to-day
decision-making, then I may not value autonomy nearly as much as someone who has quite a bit
of freedom in their everyday decision-making.
It is plausible that the general maintenance of the family could produce lower perceived
actual individual autonomy, which could be confounding the results of the statistical model.
Individuals with great responsibility and obligation towards their family may not afford to be
concerned with their own desires. Duties and obligations towards the family unit may constrain an
individual’s actions to the point where they have few opportunities to make unencumbered
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decisions. The individual may perceive their low mobility and lack of options and actively align
their preferences with the current constraints. Autonomy would not be perceived as important
because it is unaffordable, unexperienced, or unavailable.
The overall results of the full model show that even with this control variable included in
the model, both hypotheses outlined earlier are still supported. Perception of individual autonomy
has a substantial and significant impact on the preference for autonomy, but it does not diminish
the effects of the variables of interest (i.e., characteristics of the family-unit: family size and marital
status). Not only do the constraints inherent in managing one’s obligations towards the family unit
produce a devaluation in individual autonomy, but the extent and scale of the family too have a
similar effect on the dependent variable. Thus, the selected familial characteristics play a role in
the statistical model that is independent of perceived actual individual autonomy. What could
cause this? We believe that the explanation can be traced to the re-ordering of preferences
associated with the requirements of a successful adaptation to family life.

Psychological Alignment
The statistical model also provides support for the first hypothesis: being legally married
is associated with devaluing individual autonomy. The benefits obtained from the pair bonded
relationship come at the costs of a reduced autonomy. It seems to be accepted by the ESS
respondents.
Our study lends support to our second hypothesis: as the size of the family increases (i.e.,
through the addition of a family member), preference for individual autonomy decreases. It is
important to note that this effect holds for every type of member of the family. There is historical
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and contemporary evidence suggesting that, as family and household size increases, the associated
obligations, duties, and responsibilities towards other members of the household increase, as well
(Hajnal, 1965; Todd, 1985). Mutual obligations and duties are essential for sustaining a family.
They come with investments of energy, time and resources. Being able to adequately provision
and provide the appropriate amount of support would require reducing the importance of fulfilling
ego driven needs and desires. Note also that a strategy that strictly maximizes individual autonomy
signals low commitment, which may lead to a disengagement from the other members of the
family, to a loss of support, and, possibly, to ostracism and rejection.

Study Limitations and Future Directions
The ESS data is a large and representative cross-sectional survey of political, social, and
economic beliefs from a broad swath of modern Europe. The characteristics of the ESS data allow
for a modeling method that adequately and appropriately controls for various confounding
variables at multiple levels. Using a data source such as the ESS has many benefits, but there are
some drawbacks, as well. Cross-sectional data are not appropriate for making claims about a causal
relationship between variables. The statistical analysis in this study cannot definitively say that
family size causes the devaluation of the desire for autonomy; the converse, the devaluation of
individual autonomy begets larger families, could be valid. Furthermore, the data are collected at
one specific point in time in each survey respondent’s life. Although we find differences in
preference for autonomy between those who are married/not married and as the size of the family
increases, we cannot make the specific statistical claim that as each individual survey respondent
experienced marriage or an increase in family size, their preference then shifted towards devaluing
autonomy.
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Future directions in this field of research should attempt to identify the causal direction of
this relationship experimentally and/or statistically. One method for doing so would be to begin
longitudinal data collection. This type of study would be able to more adequately assess how
preferences change over time in correspondence to life history stages and past and current
circumstances. Experimental research would probably be even stronger, as it is the best way to test
definitive causal claims in the social and behavioral sciences. Developing experiments with the
appropriate controls for this type of social research may be quite complex though.

Conclusion
The desire for autonomy can provide great benefits for individuals in specific stages of
their life history, such as during the early years of maturity when social learning and exploration
are paramount to future success. However, in many situations, a strong preference for autonomy
may not be conducive to sustaining long-term investments. A strong preference for autonomy may
quickly become associated with personal volatility, unpredictability, and a tarnished reputation. A
strong preference for strict individual autonomy is bound to interfere with the maintenance of an
institution that has deep evolutionary history: the family. The results of our study show that
autonomy is less valued as family size increases and among married individuals. Maximizing the
success of the family requires persistent long-term investment and consideration of the welfare of
family members, which would necessitate the devaluation of individual autonomy. Our
psychology quickly aligns with new challenges and constraints, such as the responsibilities and
duties that come with living in families, which makes the process of reallocating resources easier,
and, indeed, personally beneficial and satisfying.
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Chapter 4 – Family and Social Cohesiveness

Abstract
To be functional, a family requires much investment from its members, as duty and
responsibility fulfillments, and time, energy and resource allocations. Investments are susceptible
to changes of the original conditions that saw their realization; hence, a stable world with low risk
and little volatility boosts confidence in the health of previous investments and encourages
decisions to keep fostering them. Do individuals belonging to large families – which come with
their increased burden of duties and responsibilities, and resource allocation needs – prefer a more
stable and cohesive social world? If such individuals do indeed display a preference for stability,
what precautions are they willing to adopt, so that stability is preserved? Using data from the
European Social Survey (Round 6, 2012), we test whether a relationship exists between
characteristics of family units and perception of social cohesiveness, tolerance for extensive
freedom of political speech, and preference for a more or less democratic government. The results
of the three random-intercept logistic regression models indicate that as the size of the family
increases 1) individuals feel closer to their community, 2) they are less tolerant of extreme political
expression, and 3) they prefer stronger government to ensure safety. We propose that these effects
of the size of the family can be understood within the context of finite resources allocation. For
individuals belonging to large families, instability might be perceived as threatening, given the
inherent risk that the disruption of existing social arrangements might afford for the sustainability
of their familial investments. The specifics of one’s familial conditions may sway him or her into
preferring certain courses of events and avoiding others, such as tolerating or not fringe political
expression, or wanting or not a strong central authority to act as institutional arbitrator.
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Introduction
Economic, intellectual and political elites generally see as assets entrepreneurship and
innovation, and the collateral disruptions that they produce. In fact, governmental and corporate
entities, and universities typically advocate addressing persistent problems through novel
engineering solutions. Innovation, and its associated disruptions, clearly benefits some. However,
change may be quite disadvantageous for specific population segments.
Western democracies have recently witnessed the dramatic transformation of many of their
norms and forms of socialities, economic livelihood, and political movements, as consequences of
a fast technological transformation (e.g., Stepanova, 2011). Rapid innovation, demands of
accelerated adaptation to changes, and increased diversification of social, political, and economic
arrangements have now become the hallmarks of most modern western polities (Rosenberg &
Birdzell, 1987; Morris, 2010). Previously improbable or unexpected outcomes, with all their new
potential social and economic benefits, have come to obtain much more systematically than in
earlier decades of just the last century (Taleb, 2007; Ridley, 2015). Such rapid technological
transformations create novel conditions that bring new opportunities, but they also dramatically
increase uncertainty. Individuals of lower socioeconomic status, with little risk-buffering
discretionary resource, should be quick to appraise how threatening such significant disruptions of
prevailing economic and social coordination could become. Moreover, and more generally, social
agents deeply invested in sets of economic, familial and social relationships should generally be
apprehensive of dramatic societal disruptions, given that they hold the potential to jeopardize
prevailing investments made in the social and economic world. At what point do such investments
in the coordination with other social and economic agents curtail the willingness of individuals to
embrace innovations with their potential benefits, but also risks attached?
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Humans benefit greatly from the company of others (Axelrod, 1984; Ridley, 1996;
Seabright, 2010; Boehm, 2012). Indeed, community living has shaped our evolution extensively,
whether it involved living with kin or unrelated others (Boehm 2012; Johnson & Earle, 2000;
Dunbar, 2003; Flinn, Quinlan, Ward, & Coe, 2007). Investing in social relationships is in fact
paramount if one wants to obtain specific types of extended benefits, such as lasting social support
and succor (e.g., Trivers, 1971). Throughout our lives, we sustain our investments in complex
coordinations with others across many different domains (e.g., economic, political, and mating
relations) at significant costs to ourselves in resources, time and energy (Olson, 1965; Hechter,
1987). One major trade-off that comes with such investments in social relationships and group
membership is the loss of some autonomy.
Individuals do not always have the choice to join a specific group, but when given the
option to stay or leave, they often decide to remain. Indeed, individuals persistently partake in the
life of groups for the benefits they can extract from their membership. (Olson, 1965). The benefits
obtained are typical club goods (Buchanan, 1965), excludable, but non-rivalrous, such as
companionship, support, social access, expertise, and recognition. These all come at a certain cost
including (self-) imposition of restrictions on decisional capacity and required contribution to the
maintenance of the collective’s institutional structure.
In a slowly changing world, groups can quickly become self-sustaining. In the process of
coordinating in groups and benefitting from those collective affiliations, individuals generate sunk
costs (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), which in turn constitute core incentives to continue investing in
those same affiliations; hence, guaranteeing the coming of future benefits, at the same time as the
preservation of the constituted collectives that those individuals helped to populate. As can be
expected, people are differentially implicated in their respective collectives, some less than others.
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A sudden increase in the availability of new social and economic options renders group cohesion
more precarious, as individual less committed through existing investments might decide to defect;
hence diminishing the value of some of the club goods in offer, making groups thusly affected less
attractive and possibly leading to their dislocation.
Innovators might be seen as avant-garde when proposing or adopting novel cultural and
social variants. But their new behaviors and beliefs also send a clear message that prevailing social
and cultural arrangements are now less valued (Olson, 1963). A few innovators in the social
landscape do not destabilize existing coordinations. Beyond a certain threshold, however, if
constant, widespread across diverse social and cultural domains, and disruptive of core institutions,
innovation has the potential to lower generalized trust and, eventually, lead to a dramatic
unraveling of social ties, rendering communities much less stable (Olson, 1963). Thus, individuals
who would benefit from a stable world – embedded as they are in social units that project their
shadow in the distant future – should display a preference for some form of efficient arbitrage to
maintain order. Indeed, sanctioning those who engage in behavior too disruptive generates its own
collective action problem (i.e., who will be the first mover to call someone out for how they act?)
(Yamagishi, 1986). Being the first to react to disruptive and unorthodox behavior may result in
large social costs and reputational damage (Guala, 2012). A third party who has been endowed
with the authority to ensure compliance provides a solution to such problem (Yamagishi, 1986;
Yamagishi, 1988; Eriksson, et al., 2017). Outsourcing monitoring and sanctioning costs to a third
party reduces the stress and cost of taking up these tasks on one’s own.
The present studies examine community perception and political preferences of individuals
living in Europe. Recent political events seem to show that those institutional arrangements can be
vilified when change occurs too fast and too drastically (Luce, 2017). Multiple populist movements
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across Europe have coalesced in response to social and economic turbulences. Such populist
reaction to changes has had a mass appeal, even for people who could be considered as moderate
(Mudde, 2000; 2004; 2007; Taggart, 2004; Oesch, 2008; Dunn, 2015). What is at play, that has
moved modern democratic electorates to adopt such conservative attitude? Adopting a moderately
conservative attitude, less embracing of change might be advantageous for some in certain
conditions.
People belonging to large families face an extra burden to coordinate with their social
surroundings. Managing the internal familial dynamics, with their associated suite of constraints,
inherently limit the options from which members of large family can choose to organize their
relations with the social world. Humans tend to seek out like-minded others and selectively
socialize with them (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Homophily goes a long way to
explain why individuals with significant family investment tend to surround themselves with
others who have similar backgrounds, charges, experiences and objectives (i.e., raising and
protecting a family), creating fairly homogenous communities comprised of social units embedded
in relatively dense inter-familial support networks, that are generally less economically and
socially mobile than other surrounding population segments (Dominguez & Watkins, 2003). The
insertion in such a social world should come with the general perception that one’s community is
quite cohesive. In turn, that perception of enhanced social cohesiveness should motivate
individuals to shun any abrupt and radical change that could threaten enduring and balanced
relations that have been carefully established. Hence, individuals belonging to a large family
should be suspicious of political entrepreneurs’ intent on capitalizing on ideas too revolutionary,
more so than relatively less committed individuals would. Such preference for the status quo
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should also be echoed in a preference for a strong arbiter, which could buttress the existing
institutional world against destabilizing forces.

Background
Self-Selection
Researchers have long noticed the tendency for individuals to collaborate and form
partnerships with others who share a similar demographic profile (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, &
Cook, 2001; Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954). Homophily is an important principle of human social
organization. It can be observed in operation in various domains of life in which individuals use
to segregate themselves according to, for instances, distinctions of race, ethnicity, sex, gender, age,
occupation, income, level of education, and religious beliefs (Marsden, 1987; 1988; Smith-Lovin
& McPherson, 1993; Cohen, 1977; Kandel, 1978; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987). People tend
to further segregate on the basis of acquired attitudes, tastes, or characteristics of subculture
(Huston & Levinger, 1978; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Bryne, 1997; Knoke, 1994).
Similarities in observable individual characteristics may be indicative of similarities in knowledge
or taste, which should ease social coordination, making such matching fundamentally attractive
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001).
Two important variables structure the ways people segregate themselves: 1) geographic
distance and 2) family ties. Geographic proximity tends to generate stronger and more robust ties,
as maintaining a social connection at a distance takes greater resource expenditure (Zipf, 1949).
Although recent technological advancements have allowed for greater long-distance
communication, which eases the maintenance costs of relationships, people still tend to create and
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strengthen ties of greater geographic proximity (Verbrugge, 1983). In fact, new technologies that
reduce the costs of maintaining social ties tend to be used for strengthening relationships between
individuals living in the same areas, rather than for sustaining geographically distant ties
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001).
An individual’s family ties structure his social interactions too. Those ties operate
differently from the non-kin-based ones; expectations, duties, and responsibilities towards each
other in a kin-based context are generally and typically more rigorous and held to higher standards
(i.e., costs of transgressing familial norms are much larger). Although families may include some
heterogeneity in attributes (e.g., members may differ in political beliefs), marriages tend to be
established along racial, ethnic, and religious lines, thus, rooting homophilic tendencies firmly into
families (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001).
Given the strong human homophilic dispositions, we expect individuals with extensive
family ties to selectively associate with others living in similar conditions and sharing similar
concerns and interests (e.g., school quality and access; after school activities; accessibility of
recreational amenities etc.) (Sweet, Swisher, & Moen, 2005). Progressive sorting might explain
the striking differences we observe between stable family-friendly and non-family-friendly and
more transient neighborhoods. Similar demographic qualities, life experiences, and attitudinal
dispositions allow for the smooth formation of social ties, creating more cohesive and durable
communities. Cohesiveness is not the same as social reach. A community might be more cohesive,
but also have shorter reach overall.

Tolerance for Novelty
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Tight-knit and highly cohesive social units reduce the cost of socially transacting (Hechter,
1987). In such worlds, social coordination is made easier and smoother, as predicting what others
might do in the future requires less effort. If most have acted or preferred ‘x, y & z’ so far, it is
reasonable to act as if those behaviors and preferences will be encountered more often than
alternative ones. The structure of a social world that privileges strong and redundant social ties,
high exit costs, and ease of access to information about others, encourages certain behavioral
repertoires (Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008). Compliance to tradition or custom and high
levels of conformity are typically found when social mobility is reduced and exit costs are high
(Yamagishi 1988b; Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008). Exit cost matters; indeed, existing
ties do not get severed when options to abandon them in favor of new ones are not worth the effort,
given the cost involved. Those who invest in maintaining a cohesive community should also find
it in their best interest to avoid outliers, those behaving unpredictably and unexpectedly. Novel
values, beliefs, or behaviors introduce disturbances in a highly cohesive world. Norm transgressors
inherently threaten social cohesiveness and the investment individuals in the community have been
making.

Preference for Strong Governance
Individuals prioritizing kin-related investments, at the expense of some social and human
capital development, should favor models of stronger and centralized governance. Past research
has argued that certain types of political regimes are more likely to appear in societies with specific
types of social interaction and coordination. Hajnal (1965) found a link between mode of familial
organization, and political and economic regimes across Europe. Adding to Hajnal’s findings,
Todd (1985) argues that the dominant form of a society’s family group generates political
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ideologies and beliefs. The type of familial interaction and coordination, the typical familial norms,
duties and responsibilities would shape the preferences for specific forms of external authority.
Why would differing modes of familial organization produce distinct preferences for governance?
It may come down to costs and resource allocation associated with maintaining extended
networks. Large families are more complex to maintain and require regular re-investment. With
greater time spent dealing with familial matters, less time and resources available should be
available for non-familial activities and tasks (Van Zandel, 2011; Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010).
Individuals from larger families should thus have fewer regular and sustained interactions outside
of the family and, overall, less extensive and frequent experiences with the social world outside of
the ones mediated by the familial network (Van Zandel, 2011; Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010). The
lack of information on others may make it interesting and attractive to outsource tasks to an
external third-party. A strong government can fill the role of the monitoring and sanctioning
apparatus.

Data
Data – European Social Survey (Round 6, 2012)
All three studies rely on data of the European Social Survey (Round 6, 2012) for their
analyses. The European Social Survey assesses public opinion patterns, changes, and trends on
various social, political, and economic issues across 29 countries in and around Europe.8 The data

8

The European Social Survey comprises individual-level data from 29 countries: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kosovo,
Lithuania, Netherland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.
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is collected by teams of fieldworkers in face-to-face interviews. Survey respondents are at least 15
years old. Although several iterations occurred since the 2012 survey, the latter is the most
comprehensive set of data available for analysis as of yet.

Study 1: Family Investment and Community Closeness
The first study examines the relationship between size of the family and perception of
community cohesiveness. In this study, we are not exactly measuring whether the community is
more cohesive but whether the size of the family to which an individual belongs influences how
cohesive the community seems to him or her. As a proxy for perception of community
cohesiveness, we select the ESS question that asks respondents how close they feel to others in
their local area. People have a tendency for homophilic socializing; they tend to interact and
socialize with individuals that they perceive as similar (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001;
Byrne, 1997). People also tend to implicitly sort themselves geographically, converging toward
areas where like-minded others can be found, which creates relatively homogeneous local
communities, reducing substantially social transaction costs as interactions between individuals is
made easier (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Furthermore, interacting regularly with
individuals sharing similar life experiences, concerns and objectives, and of similar social
standings is bound to engender a greater sense of homogeneity. While all individuals preferentially
sort themselves into groups with similar others, those who lack mobility, because of high exit costs
(e.g., having or depending on a large family), are less able to re-sort themselves quickly if their
social investment are compromised. Lower mobility may motivate individuals to further invest, to
reinforce existing ties, and to do what is necessary to ensure that their current investments remain
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healthy. Study (1) tests whether there is a relationship between family size and the perception of
community cohesiveness.

Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1: As the size of their family increases, individuals feel closer to members of their
community.

Methods
Dependent Variable
The European Social Survey asks respondents to assess how close respondents feel to
people in their local area. This variable has a 5-point scale that ranges from “Agree strongly” to
“Disagree strongly”. To assist with interpretability, the original ordinal dependent variable was
transformed into a dichotomous variable. The newly generated variable splits ESS respondents
who agree in some capacity from those who do not agree. Respondents who answered, “Agree
strongly” or “Agree” are coded as a “1”. Respondents who answer, “Neither agree nor disagree,”
“Disagree,” or “Disagree strongly” are coded as a “0”. Recoding the variable in this manner allows
us to identify individuals who definitively affirm that they feel close to others in the local area
from other respondents.
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Table 13. Distribution of responses for original
variable9
Frequency Percentage
Agree strongly
7,978
14.76
Agree
25,785
47.72
Neither agree nor disagree
12,728
23.56
Disagree
6,160
11.40
Disagree strongly
1,384
2.56
Total
54,035
100

Table 14. Distribution of responses for recoded
dependent variable
Frequency Percentage
Agree
20,272
37.52
Does not agree
33,763
62.48
Total
54,035
100

Key Independent Variables
This study tracks the effect that the size of the family in which the respondents live has on
feelings of closeness with others in the local area. The independent variable of interest is family
size, as measured by the number of spouses, children, parents, siblings, and other relatives living
in the household. To generate this variable, we relied on the household composition data found in
the ESS. The ESS asks respondents to list all regular members of the household, their age,
relationship to the respondent, and gender. The ESS asks whether non-relatives live with the
respondent, as well, but this relationship was not taken into account for generating the family size
variable. Non-relatives (e.g., housemates/roommates) come with different duties and obligations
than relatives and therefore may not be comparable to relatives. In addition to the family size

9

Descriptive statistics contain all observations
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variable, the model also includes gender (being female coded as “1”, while males are “0”) and
marital status (legally married is coded as “1”, not being legally married is coded as “0”).

Control variables
Several control variables are included in the statistical model. These variables are relevant
for evaluating the importance of individual autonomy in decision-making. This includes: 1)
respondent’s age in number of years, 2) respondent’s years of education, 3) respondent’s annual
income as percentile rank (categories are ranked 1 to 10 in deciles), 4) respondent’s ethnic status
(coded 1 if the respondent indicated that he or she belonged to an ethnic minority), and 5)
respondent’s political orientation on the left-right scale. The left-right scale is provided by the ESS
as a 0 to 10 ordinal scale. Respondents must indicate where they stand, with the maximum on the
left being a “0” and the maximum on the right being a “10”. Two dichotomous variables were
generated to represent having either left- or right-leaning political orientation. Those who
responded 0, 1, 2, or 3 were categorized as “left”, while those who responded 7, 8, 9, or 10 were
categorized as “right”. Everyone else was given 0s for both dichotomous variables. They are our
centrists.
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Table 15. Descriptive statistics (N = 54,673)
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev. Min Max
Family size
1.75
1.50
0
23
Marital status
.50
.50
0
1
Gender
.54
.50
0
1
Education
12.54
4.03
0
51
Annual income
5.06
2.81
1
10
Politics – Left
.17
.38
0
1
Politics – Right
.24
.43
0
1
Age
48.31
18.59
15
103

Method of Analysis
Survey respondents may have refused to answer a question, not provided an answer, or not
known what to answer. All observations for the various types of non-responses listed here were
removed from the estimation of the statistical model using list-wise deletion.
The statistical model is estimated using logistic regression, given the recoding of the
dependent variable from an ordinal scale to a dichotomous scale. A random-intercept is included
in the statistical model to account for country-level variance. This allows for measurement of the
heterogeneity of political, social and economic conditions across Europe. This is particularly
important because the ESS contains a highly varied set of countries. By including a country-level,
we can more precisely estimate the coefficients for the individual-level variables. GDP per capita
and countries’ score on the Gini index are modeled as contextual variables10. GDP per capita may
not be the most precise measure of a country’s wealth or prosperity. However, it is an efficient
way to model a variety of country-specific socio-political and economic factors, as it is highly
correlated with other factors such as political stability, corruption, female empowerment, and

10

GDP per capita and Gini values for the year 2012 were obtained from the World Bank database.
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general health (see: Diebolt & Perrin, 2013; Mauro, 1995). The Gini index score is a measure of a
country’s wealth disparity. Both contextual variables provide greater elaboration on the countrylevel phenomena that influence the dependent variable, while also providing a greater refinement
for the estimation of the coefficients of the individual-level variables.
The multi-level logistic regression model is computed using the GLLAMM package of
Stata 14.1 software. Adaptive quadrature is used for the estimation of the model, as it offers greater
computational efficiency and precision (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, & Pickles, 2002; Rabe-Hesketh,
Skrondal, & Pickles, 2004). Thirty integration points were specified for the computation. ESSprovided sample weights accounting for unequal probabilities of sample selection are included in
the analysis.

Results
Our model shows statistically significant results for two of the variables of interest: marital
status and family size. Individuals who are legally married have 22% higher odds than unmarried
individuals of feeling close to others in the local community. For every additional family member
living in the respondent’s household, there is a 13% increase in the odds of feeling close to others
in the local area.
Education and right-leaning politics also reach statistical significance. Every additional
year of education decreases by 3% the odds of feeling close to others in the local area. With a mean
of approximately 12 years of education, this effect is quite large (36% increase in odds).
Individuals with right-leaning political views have 16% higher odds of feeling closer to those in
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their local area than centrists. There is no significant effect for fostering left-leaning political
views. The country-level effects, GDP per capita and Gini score are not statistically significant.

Table 16. Study 1 Model Results: Random-intercept Logistic
Regression (N = 37,698)
Odds-ratio [SE]
95% CI
p
1.02 [.002]
1.01 - 1.02
Age
***
.97 [.005]
.96 - .98
Education
***
.99 [.011] 0.254
.97 - 1.01
Annual income
1.03 [.038] 0.366
.96 - 1.10
Politics - left
1.16 [.042]
1.08 - 1.24
Politics - right
***
1.02 [.037] 0.516
.95 - 1.10
Gender
1.22 [.039]
1.15 - 1.30
Marital status
***
1.13 [.015]
1.11 - 1.17
Family size
***
.90 [.09] 0.275
GDP Per Capita (log)
.97 [.019] 0.105
Gini score
Note: Values in brackets are robust standard errors.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

.74 - 1.09
.93 - 1.01

Discussion
Overall Findings
Marital status and family size are significantly associated with our dependent variable,
feeling closer to those in the local area. The effect of family size is quite large with a 13% increase
in odds for every additional member living in the household. These two effects hold even when
taking into consideration several relevant control variables, such as annual income and years of
education. Institutional differences across Europe were statistically controlled for in the multilevel model. The robustness of the analysis illustrates that characteristics of the family explain
closeness to the community, which is not fully accounted for by the other socio-economic
characteristics selected.
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The dependent variable was not an objective measure of how close people in the
community are, but of perception of cohesiveness. It is important to note that such perception does
not require there to be actual cohesiveness through established and robust social ties. Individuals
with large families may invest heavily in their family and they may have few resources left for
investing in non-familial activities (Greif, 2006; de Moor & van Zanden, 2010; Ermisch &
Gambetta, 2011). The perception of closeness may be the result of the social world they have
selectively built for themselves, which tends to be one filled with others who are in similar life
conditions and social standing. We propose that the effect that we identified linking larger family
size to the perception of greater community cohesiveness could be traced to a process of social
self-selection and assortative socializing. Individuals from large families are more likely to
establish themselves in certain types of neighborhoods that provide various amenities of interest
to a family, such as: parks, schools, and child-friendly infrastructure. Individual initiatives to fulfill
preferences, in the aggregate, can generate sizeable social phenomena, such as the geographic
separation of certain groups of individuals (Schelling, 1978).
Those who have extensive family networks may also find their family useful for gathering
information about others in their local area, even without direct interaction and social exchange
with them. As the family network grows, the ability to use kin members as intermediaries to others
also increases. In this case, you may not know that many people directly or personally, but you
can easily predict qualities of an individual from information gathered through familial networks.
Indirect ties through family members may make the social world around seem more cohesive than
it would be if cohesiveness was measured through the number of direct ties.

Study 2: Political Tolerance
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Study 1 highlights the link between perception of community cohesiveness and size of
family. The cohesiveness of a community reduces social uncertainty, as it lowers social transaction
costs. Information on others is more readily available, which can then be used to predict behavior
and plan accordingly. Our earlier finding leads to an additional line of inquiry: is there a link
between size of family and intolerance for novel or fringe beliefs? It can be difficult to predict the
behavior of individuals who hold beliefs that are not widely held or have not been previously
encountered. Low predictability of individual beliefs and subsequent behaviors may generate
instability. While different sources can generate instability, one particular form often manifests
itself under the guise of extreme political expression. In study 2, we test whether there is a link
between tolerance for extreme political expression and family size.

Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1: As family size increases, respondents express less tolerance toward extreme political
expression.

Methods
Dependent and Independent Variables
The ESS asks whether respondents agree with the following statement: “everyone should
be free to express political views, even extreme”. This question has 3 response options: 1) “Free
to express extreme political views”, 2) “Prevented from expressing extreme political views”, or 3)
“It depends on the circumstances”. The categorical dependent variable was recoded into a

83

dichotomous variable. Respondents who chose “It depends on the circumstances” were removed.
Individuals who chose “Free to express extreme political views” received a “1”, while those who
chose “Prevented from expressing extreme political views” received a “0”. This variable
effectively measures whether respondents believe individuals should be free to express extreme
political views or not.
The independent variables of interest, family size, marital status, and gender, are the same
as for Study 1. The control variables, annual income, years of education, political orientation (left
and right), and age, are also identical to the ones in the previous study.

Table 17. Distribution of responses for original variable11
Frequency Percentage
Free to express extreme political views
37,864
72.77
Prevented from expressing extreme political views
8,957
17.22
It depends on the circumstances
5,208
10.01
Total
52,029
100

Table 18. Distribution of responses for recoded
dependent variable
Prevented from expressing extreme political views
Free to express extreme political views
Total

Frequency
Percentage
8,957
19.13
37,864
80.87
46,821
100

Method of Analysis
The modeling technique used in Study 1 is also used in Study 2.

11

Descriptive statistics contain all observations
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Results
Only two of the variables in the statistical model were significant: family size and years of
education. Every additional family member living as a regular member of the household leads to
a decrease of 4% in the odds of favoring the free expression of extreme political views. Marital
status and gender were not significantly associated with free political expression.
Most control variables were not significantly associated with openness to extreme political
expression. This includes all individual-level variables, but for education, and both country-level
variables. Education is associated with higher odds of favoring entirely free political expression
with a rather modest 1% increase in odds for every year of education obtained.

Table 19. Study 2 Model Results: Random-intercept Logistic
Regression (N = 34,044)
Odds-ratio [SE]
95% CI
p
.996 [.002]
.993 - .999
Age
**
1.01 [.006]
1.00 - 1.03
Education
*
1.02 [.008] 0.058
.99 - 1.03
Annual income
1.08
[.064]
.97 - 1.22
Politics – left
0.188
1.05 [.060] 0.375
.94 - 1.17
Politics – right
.998 [.040] 0.968
.92 - 1.09
Gender
1.01 [.041] 0.774
.93 - 1.10
Marital status
.96
[.012]
.94 - .98
Family size
**
1.05 [.142] 0.696
GDP per capita (log)
1.02 [.028] 0.365
Gini score
Note: Values in brackets are robust standard errors.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Discussion
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.81 - 1.37
.97 - 1.08

Overall Findings
The results of the statistical analysis support the hypothesis outlined earlier. We found that
for every additional family member living in the household, there is a corresponding 4% decrease
in the odds of supporting freedom to express extreme political views. This effect holds even when
controlling for other relevant socio-political variables, including age, years of education, annual
income, and political orientation. Further statistical controls were implemented at the country-level
(GDP per capita and Gini index score for each country) to account for the large cultural and
institutional heterogeneity across the countries surveyed in the ESS. Despite all those controls, the
statistical model suggests that family size is of particular interest for explaining intolerance toward
extreme political views.
The findings may follow from the attitude of individuals with large investments who look
to reduce potential instability. Maintaining the cohesiveness of the social world requires that
potential instability be mitigated. Political instability may be particularly disruptive, as it can
produce dramatic transformation of the status quo, and the more extreme the political project, the
more so. The modifications of foundational institutional rules under which prevailing long-term
costly investments were initially made jeopardize their expected payoffs.
Extreme political beliefs are far removed from median political views. Extreme political
expressions do not have to be on the far-left or far-right, they simply can be extreme deviations
from each individual’s public policy ideal point. Extreme may simply be anything that would
potentially change and disrupt the political world from where you would ideally like it to be.
Extreme politics typically aim at drastic modifications of the foundational social, economic, and
political institutions and laws that govern a society. Lower tolerance for extreme political views
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would be a reasonable strategy to pursue for an individual wishing to maintain the status quo and
ensure that his/her investments are not devalued.

Study 3: Strong Government
Maintenance of a family comes with opportunity costs: fewer resources can be dedicated
to non-kin related activities, thus resulting in less familiarity with the social world beyond one’s
kin network (Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010). Given the constraints on the amount of social capital
they can build and their keen interest in maintaining social, economic and political stability,
individuals belonging to large families might find attractive models of strong governance, which
could ensure the preservation of the family-centric investments on which they depend, even if such
political choice comes with major trade-offs. Past research shows that there is a relationship
between family structure and political regimes (Hajnal, 1965; Todd, 1985; Dilli, 2016). Certain
types of families are typically found in association with specific types of governments: nuclear
families with liberal governance and extended hierarchical families with less democratic political
authorities (Hajnal, 1965; Todd, 1985; Dilli, 2016). None of these studies specify the contours of
the attitudes toward or preferences for the respective political regimes observed. Study 3
investigates whether there exists an association between family size and preference for strong
government, relying on individual-level survey data.

Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1: As their family size increases, respondents show a greater preference for strong
government.
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Methods
Dependent Variable
The ESS asks respondents how much the following statement describes their own position:
“It is important to her/him that the government ensures her/his safety against all threats. She/he
wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.” Respondents are given a scale with six
choices to choose from, (1) “Very much like me”, (2) “Like me”, (3) “Somewhat like me”, (4) “A
little like me”, (5) “Not like me”, and (6) “Not like me at all”. The ordinal scale was converted
into a dichotomous scale with two options, (1) “This statement describes me well,” and, (2) “This
statement does not describe me well.” To categorize the responses into the newly generated
dichotomous variable, we split the original scale directly down the middle. Respondents
categorized as “This statement describes me well,” chose options, “Very much like me”, “Like
me”, and “Somewhat like me”. The other response category, “This statement does not describe me
well,” comprises respondents who indicated either, “A little like me”, “Not like me”, or “Not like
me at all”. Recoding the variable allows for greater ease in computation and interpretability of the
statistical model. See Table 20 below for frequencies and cumulative percentages of the original
scale and Table 21 for the new dichotomous scale.
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Table 20. Distribution of responses for original
variable12
Frequency Percentage
Very much like me
16,955
31.63
Like me
19,829
36.99
Somewhat like me
9,794
18.27
A little like me
4,458
8.32
Not like me
2,087
3.89
Not like me at all
487
.91
Total
53,610
100

Table 21. Distribution of responses for recoded
dependent variable
Frequency Percentage
Not like me at all
7,032
13.12
Like me
46,578
86.88
Total
53,610
100

Method of Analysis
The modeling technique used in Study 1 is also used in Study 3.

Results
Two of the three variables of interest have a statistically significant effect on the preference
for strong government. For each additional family member living in the household, there is a 6%
increase in the odds of favoring strong government. Women have 8% higher odds than men, of
favoring a strong government.

12

Descriptive statistics contain all observations
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The control variables age and years of education are significantly associated with a
preference for strong government. The effect for age was quite small, with less than 1% higher
odds per additional year in age. Every additional year of education corresponds to a 4% decrease
in odds of favoring a strong government. Looking at the country-level effects, only GDP per capita
was statistically significant. As the GDP of a country increases, the odds of favoring a strong
government decrease. The Gini score was nearing significance.

Table 22. Study 3 Model Results: Random-intercept Logistic
Regression (N = 37,524)
Odds-ratio [SE]
95% CI
p
1.00 [.002]
1.00 - 1.01
Age
*
.98
[.013]
.96 - 1.01
Annual income
0.113
.96 [.006]
.95 - .97
Education
***
.86 [.069] 0.051
.73 - 1.00
Politics – left
1.07 [.082] 0.392
.92 - 1.24
Politics – right
1.08
[.042]
1.00
- 1.17
Gender
*
1.03 [.051] 0.488
.94 - 1.14
Marital status
1.06 [.014]
1.04 - 1.09
Family size
***
.73 [.116] 0.049
GDP per capita (log)
1.04 [.026] 0.076
Gini score
Note: Values in brackets are robust standard errors.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

.54 - .99
.99 - 1.10

Discussion
Overall Findings
Our statistical analysis shows that family size influences the preference for a strong
government. Even with the inclusion of several other relevant socio-political variables, family size
was the most statistically significant variable in the model. The results of our model suggest that
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there is a crucial factor, family size, that shapes the preference for a strong government, beyond
the typical social, economic, and political characteristics of education, income, political beliefs.
As the size of the family increases, developing, maintaining, and monitoring one’s ties
outside the familial network can become increasingly more difficult. The high cost of sustaining
family ties (e.g., making sure you follow through with the duties and responsibilities you have
towards the family) is an opportunity cost that interferes with maintaining one’s non-familial
network, overall reducing the amount of social capital one can build. Individuals with less social
capital know less about the characteristics and qualities of others in the social world, thus, making
it more difficult, costlier, and time consuming for those individuals to evaluate and assess potential
novel social partners. Given such constraints, it may be in those individuals’ best interest to favor
outsourcing more social monitoring to a more powerful third-party arbitrator. A strong central state
could be attractive, as it may guarantee stability, while offsetting the costs associated with social
monitoring and sanctioning. Although ensuring safety can come with major costs, such costs may
be deemed worth absorbing if stability is guaranteed. Indeed, individual preference for stability
may outrank the desire for an open social order (Hajnal, 1965; Todd, 1985).
The effect for females may be related to differences in life history between the sexes and
predisposition for taking risks. Females are more likely to endure most of the burden of
childrearing and/or general household maintenance. Females are also much more risk-averse than
males (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999). High risk-aversion coupled with carrying the heavy cost
of general family maintenance and/or childrearing may elicit a greater female precautionary
response. If you are in a more fragile position, a strong arbiter may be a desirable form of
governance. It may be that the question posed by the ESS included language about ensuring safety.
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The effect for females may be driven by such preference, rather than driven by the desire for a
strong government in and of itself.

Overall Discussion
Summary of All Findings
The three studies presented in this paper target how family structure influences sociopolitical perceptions and preferences. The first study highlighted the relationship between family
size and perception of community cohesiveness. As an individual’s family size increases,
individuals perceive the community as more cohesive. A cohesive community is a club good that
individuals would have great interest in maintaining. Any variable disrupting such cohesiveness is
a major threat. Extreme political expression may be an example of such destabilizing threat. In
study 2, we found that there was a relationship between size of family and attitude towards free
political expression. As family size increases, there was a lower tolerance for individuals to be
allowed to express extreme political views. Finally, we asked whether there was a relationship
between family size and preference for strong third-party arbitrator. As family size increased, there
was greater preference for a strong third-party arbitrator. All statistical models accounted for the
demographic and socio-political factors that might have been influencing perception or
preferences, which suggested that there was something particularly important about family size
for individual perceptions and preferences.

Social Cohesiveness & Its Preservation
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Families require extensive coordination among members regarding duties, obligations, and
responsibilities. The amount of investment inwards reduces the amount of resources that can be
invested externally, in non-familial endeavors (de Moor & van Zanden, 2010; van Zanden, 2011).
Reducing uncertainty and mitigating risk are necessary in order to maintain the confidence that the
investment made will still be paying off. This paper presented a possible set of risk-reduction
strategies, which involved individuals selectively sorting themselves in the social landscape.
Humans’ natural psychological predisposition to surround themselves with other like-minded
individuals could be an essential mechanism for reducing the costs of social transacting.
Individuals must allocate a finite set of resources by prioritizing various tasks and activities
(Del Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015). Finding a mate, deciding to start a family, and
providing for offspring is a huge cost that individuals must endure for a long period of time. There
is a search cost associated with finding the appropriate friends or social group, in addition to the
costs associated with locating the correct neighborhood. The sunk cost resulting from such an
expensive investment would provide incentive for individuals to prefer stability over novelty,
especially if such novelty can potentially generate social, economic, and political disruptions and
put their investment at risk.
Study 1 found that as the family scales up in size, the perception of community cohesion
increases. Cohesive communities reduce transaction costs by having information on other social
agents more readily available. Social cohesiveness is only achieved if there is a sustained
investment from a sizeable proportion of community members. A highly cohesive community may
not entirely benefit from or appreciate the introduction of novel and extreme beliefs, attitudes, and
behaviors. Social agents with novel beliefs would be harder to collaborate with (i.e., more difficult
to form expectations on how they would behave since there is no past history of interaction).
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Further, these types of individuals infiltrating a community may reduce the investments others in
the community have previously made. With their investment in the community on the line, we
should expect there to be little interest in allowing for the expression of extreme views that could
potentially reduce coordination and disrupt the fundamental institutions that govern day-to-day
interactions. Freedom to express extreme political views can directly increase the overall costs of
monitoring and sanctioning, while reducing the value of investments made into the community.
Individuals with large family households would have their budgets stretched thin. This may
make full involvement in community organization and maintenance a major burden on their
already strained resources. Our results suggest that the desire for maintaining a cohesive and stable
social world with an inability to fully invest in directly making sure it is maintained produces
specific preferences in a model of government, a strong government. Outsourcing monitoring and
sanctioning to a third-party would be ideal for individuals in this situation, as it is lower cost and
provides assurances that their investments will payout.
Ongoing and sustained investments into specific modes of social organization and
coordination may provide the right incentives to prefer certain sets of social norms (e.g., showing
little tolerance for free expression) and governing practices (e.g., preferring a stronger third-party
authority for ensuring safety). Ways in which society can reduce the probability of change and
innovation, if this secures critical investments, would be favored over sets of norms and institutions
that allow for greater innovation, if it meant critical investments were to be devalued. Institutions
that could potentially introduce destabilization of existing modes of coordination would be
disfavored as it is disadvantageous for some to re-coordinate.
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Limitations and Future Directions
The ESS data allows us to test for relationships using a relatively large and diverse set of
participants knowing that the appropriate measures were taken for sampling methods and data
collection. The three studies presented in this paper have significant and substantial effects for the
variables of interest. All three statistical models include a set of control variables for other relevant
socioeconomic factors. The robustness of the modeling method was further reinforced by using a
random-intercept to model the country-level properties, which thus accounts for the cultural and
institutional heterogeneity across the 29 countries surveyed in the ESS. At the country-level further
controls were instantiated for each country by including economic and inequality indicators (GDP
per capita and Gini index score).
There is a trade-off between size and diversity of the data and what can be claimed from
the results of our analyses. Although the appropriate steps were taken to control for relevant
confounding factors, the nature of data does present some limitations to what can be claimed from
the results of the study. First, the ESS dataset is a cross-sectional survey. Cross-sectional data
limits (causal) interpretation of the results. Cross-sectional data cannot get at the causal link
between a set of variables as easily as longitudinal or experimental methods could. Indeed, reverse
causation is a plausible scenario (e.g., preferences causing family size to increase).
Preferences causing individuals to start big families is plausible, and while we cannot
eliminate the possibility of reverse causation statistically, the nature of the data makes the
argument weaker than it would otherwise be. The ESS surveys individuals who may take up a
variety of positions in the household. These individuals can range from anywhere from singletons
to the parents who are the creators and heads of household, or possibly, siblings, children,
grandparents, or other relatives. Reverse causation (i.e., preferences cause people to create bigger
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families) is more plausible if the data were restricted to only respondents who are the creators of
the household. It is less plausible when we begin discussing the effect we measured takes into
consideration individuals who are not the creators of the household, but simply members of the
household. While it is plausible they remain members of the large family household because of
their preference for it, it is possible that the costs associated with leaving the family (e.g., loss of
investment coupled with low social capital) may tweak them into preferring to stay inside such a
household as it is optimal given their circumstances.
There are a few possible solutions to better understand the causal direction. Building a
longitudinal study where the cohorts or participants are followed over a period, while repeatedly
measuring perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs as these individuals progress through different stages
of their lives would be one method of gathering this data. Such a method comes with downsides,
as it is time consuming, costly, and suffers from participant drop-out. Additionally, designing an
experimental protocol for assessing these preferences would be ideal for explaining causation.
Designing such an experiment would be challenging, especially when considering the
generalizability and ecological validity of the experiment.

Conclusion
Families are the building block of human social organization and require extensive
investment in the form of duties, obligations, and resources. Individuals who have or are investing
heavily in the family would benefit from greater assurance that their investment will be successful.
Confidence in the prospects of one’s investment paying off, and the incentive to continue
investing, requires a stable and predictable world. In the three studies outlined throughout the
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paper, we found that family size is associated with a greater perception of community cohesion,
greater intolerance for the expression of extreme political views, and a preference for strong
government. We propose that these results are due to families selectively associating with others
who are in similar social and economic strata, who may also have similar life experiences or
trajectory. Such a community would be highly cohesive and provide the needed stability for
continue to invest in a long-term endeavor. Further, intolerance for extreme political views may
be due to the need to reduce all potential forms of social, economic, or political disruption. Finally,
a strong government may provide the necessary third-party arbitration in a world where resources
are stretched thin and it is too costly to monitor the social world effectively and efficiently. Our
results suggest that there are certain social ecologies that are ideal for large families to thrive and
flourish.
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion
Overview
The institution of the family has had profound influence on the development of the sociopolitical and economic world (Hajnal, 1965; 1982; Todd, 1985; 1987; De Vries, 2008; Clark,
2014). Familial units are found in various forms across human societies and have had a deep
evolutionary past (Brown, 1991). Many aspects of human cognition, social behavior, and social
organization were designed through evolution around family requirements (Hrdy, 2007; 2011; van
Schaik & Bukhart, 2010). Intergenerational transfers of knowledge, skills, and resources is crucial
for our species adaptive success and fitness (Gurven, Stieglitz, Hooper, Gomes, & Kaplan, 2012).
Individuals’ development is the product of the collaboration of kin networks. Given the
significance of the family over human evolutionary history, we should expect to find associations
between psychological features and particular stages of individuals’ family life (e.g., Lieberman,
Tooby, & Cosmides, 2007).
Past research on family structure has noted the association between specific morphological
features of the family and social, political, and economic conditions. Hajnal (1965; 1982) makes
the case that changes to patterns in household organization, marriage, and birthing were the
catalysts for large-scale changes in society’s institutions. Family-based households went from
housing multiple generations of kin to the more restricted nuclear family. A smaller household and
the concomitant reduction in familial responsibilities allow for greater investment in non-familial
domains (e.g., human and social capital development). The change in household and marriage
patterns spurs development, growth, and wealth creation (De Vries, 1994; 2008). Todd (1985;
1987) builds on Hajnal’s work, categorizing families on the basis of several features – among
which size of household and relationship between co-residents – and identifying the respective
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family types’ socio-political correlates. He finds that specific family types (e.g., large hierarchical
families) are systematically associated with particular modes of governance (e.g.,
authoritarianism). Todd defends the position that particular family forms generate receptive
attitudes to particular ideologies. Todd also finds that the variables associated with growth and
development in Europe, such as high degree of literacy and delayed marriage, are strongly
associated to specific family organizations.
Research examining the relationship between family and social and political preferences
has generally been correlational, connecting average country and region indicators to presence or
absence of specific socio-political characteristics (e.g., Hajnal, 1965; Todd, 1985; Greif &
Tabellini, 2010). Few studies have systematically investigated the attitudes, preferences and
cognition of individuals belonging to specific forms of household, large or small (Ermisch &
Gambetta, 2010; Alesina & Giuliano, 2010; 2013). The studies presented in this dissertation were
designed to fill in some of the gaps in the existing research and to test hypotheses using robust
statistical analyses.
Relying on an individual-level dataset from the ESS has allowed for a substantial
discussion about individuals’ incentives and motivations, going beyond tracking associations
between country averages and specific socio-political features. Indeed, the studies offer an
important contribution to the study of the role of family structure and household composition in
the development of socio-political attitudes and preferences. The research did not restrict itself to
defining and categorize the existing types of families, as past researchers have done (e.g., Todd,
1985; Dilli, 2016). Categorizing and creating family types provides a rich descriptive account of
what is taking place (e.g., nuclear families is associated with liberal democracy), but it does not
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provide an explanation of what particular aspects of the family generate such consequences (i.e.,
is it size? or is it because the family is multi-generational?).

Summary of Overall Findings
Study (1), we tested whether there was a relationship between family morphology and
preference for tradition and custom. While what constitutes traditions and customs differs between
individuals, it does so superficially only. A tradition or custom is a stable set of beliefs or practices,
i.e., what has been practiced in the past and will continue into the future. Marriage and family are
costly investments (Mortenson, 1988). Lengthy and substantial investments that take a long period
of time to come to fruition should discourage risky behaviors (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Arks
& Blumer, 1985). The results of study (1) showed that there was a positive association between
family morphology (i.e., co-residents and size of household) and preference for maintaining
tradition and custom. As the size of the household grew, the preference for tradition and custom
did too. Additionally, this effect differed depending on the type of relation (e.g., living with
children had a larger effect than living with other relatives).
Study (2) investigated the relation between family size and preference for autonomy in
decision-making. Independence and self-sufficiency are typically understood as crucial for success
when navigating the modern economic world. However, maximizing autonomy may not be useful
at all stages of one’s life. For a young adult, autonomy may provide genuine benefits. For others,
such as those with partners and offspring, and younger dependents, an extensive autonomy may
not be useful or desirable. The study’s results showed that there was a negative relationship
between family size and preference for autonomy: as family size increased, the value of autonomy
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decreased. This effect holds even when statistically controlling for a variety of other relevant socioeconomic factors, in addition to each respondent’s perceived degree of actual autonomy. Family
size distinctly affects the value of individual autonomy. This effect might be due to a psychological
adaptation that lessens the importance of autonomy, while upregulating and increasing the
investment of resources towards family, offspring and kin.
Study (3) tested whether there was a relationship between family size and perception of
social cohesiveness and the desire to see specific dispositions being implemented to maintain that
cohesiveness. The results showed that as family size increased, perception of cohesiveness did too.
We further tested whether there was a relation between family size and the wish to see the
implementation of specific dispositions for maintaining community cohesiveness. We specifically
looked at (1) intolerance for destabilizing outlier political expression and, (2) greater preference
for a strong central arbiter. Results of the statistical analyses indicated that as family size increased,
tolerance for extreme political views decreased and preference for a strong arbiter increased. The
importance of social cohesiveness and stability might be explained by the risk-averseness of
individuals belonging to larger families who are deeply invested in specific social coordinations.
Extreme political expression is potentially destabilizing, as it adds an unpredictable variable into
the social and political world. Outsourcing the monitoring and sanctioning of norm violators to a
centralized authority reduces the costs of socially transacting for individuals who have demanding
familial investments.

General Discussion
Finding an Effect in Modern Europe
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All studies and analyses were done using survey data from modern Europe collected circa
2010-2012. One of the more remarkable findings is that the effect of the family characteristics on
the various socio-political attitudes and preferences was still significant and substantial, even
among individuals living in developed and post-industrialized countries. One of the major
arguments put forth by Hajnal (1965) and Todd (1985; 1987) is that the modern social, political,
and economic world is the product of changes to family, marriage, and birthing patterns. Our
findings are interesting because it seems to suggest that even with drastic changes to our social,
economic, and political life, the family institution still encourages certain behavioral strategies.
The effect found for family is unrelated to characteristics of the time and place, or other properties
of the setting in which each individual finds herself. Additionally, the inclusion of the countrylevel with GDP per capita and Gini index score in the model suggests that these effects are not due
to properties of the country-specific cultural, political, or economic institutions. It seems that there
is something particularly constraining about the family, as it scales up in size and scope, regardless
of time, place, and, broadly, institutional stability, effectiveness, and efficiency. We argue that it
is not just an effect of social, political, or economic institutions or history, but it is the result of
adaptive strategies pursued by individuals, given the incentives they face, and the payoffs they
may expect. As its size and scope scale up, the family may constrain the availability of choices.
Because of the sizeable investment required for a large family, the scope of the social world can
become reduced. With high membership cost (i.e., in the form of duties and obligations over the
long-term) and a high exit cost (i.e., loss of reputation, ostracization, social support from family),
there is greater reason for individuals to conform to the average standards practiced within the
closed institutional system, as the cost of not doing so is extraordinary. Within such a world it may
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be strategic for an individual to prefer the status quo, to devalue individual autonomy, and to want
to limit potentially socially disruptive factors.

Prudent Minds & Conservative Attitude
The results of the studies contained in this dissertation give a clearer picture on what factors
influence individuals to approach the world more prudently and, generally, with a more
conservative attitude. Individuals address the situations and circumstances they face in their
everyday lives with a certain tolerance for risk. Their tolerance is influenced by multiple variables,
including: 1) individual differences (e.g., psychological predispositions), 2) life history stage (e.g.,
age, male/female, environmental risk, etc.), and 3) institutions (e.g., norms, expectations, etc.).
The studies in this dissertation added an additional component that influences the amount of risk
individuals are willing to take: family investment. These studies highlighted how the composition
and size of the family mattered a great deal in the modulation of the tolerance individuals have for
engaging in risky endeavors.
Our research findings suggest that belonging to a large family that requires sustained
investment through duties and responsibilities, time and energy, and resources lowers the risk
individuals are willing to take. We argue that the opportunity cost associated with investing in a
large family unit reduces individual mobility and adaptability to changing situations. The sunk
cost of previous investments weighs in on responses to new circumstances. It is not as easy to
respond to a novel and constantly evolving situation because of, 1) the risk of losing previous
investments and, 2) the constraints on resource availability (given the opportunity cost). This
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situation provides the incentive for individuals to genuinely want to maintain the status quo, as
this solidifies the health of previous and ongoing social investments.
In the aggregate, individual responses produce large-scale social phenomena that shape
incentives, payoffs, and institutional arrangements. A strict adherence to past values and practices,
coupled with a diminished desire for individual autonomy, may result in social worlds with high
levels of collective conservativism and strategic conformism. Such a socio-political world may not
adapt smoothly to a dynamic and fast-changing world.
Socio-political worlds with strict regulation of values, beliefs, and behaviors may not allow
for much experimentation and dissent or even deliberations about alternative choices. Collective
conservatism is the attachment to past social or political choices (Kuran, 1987). Preference
falsification is one mechanism by which collective conservativism can obtain (Kuran, 1987).
Preference falsification occurs when people publicly misrepresent the state of their beliefs for fear
of social reprobation (Kuran, 1987; 1997; 1998; Kuran & Sunstein, 1999). This can result in less
development, progress, and growth overall, which can partially explain the differences in social,
political, and economic conditions between regions and countries.

Study Advantages and Limitations
Designing a study around data sources like the European Social Survey has many
advantages and benefits. One major advantage is that it provides a large set of observations (i.e.,
N > 50,000). The sample is also diverse and is as representative as possible (with ESS-provided
weights for adjusting the probability of selection for each country). In addition, the method of data
collection employed by the ESS field work team is more representative than some of the typical
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methods of collecting data for social science research, such as snowball sampling, convenience
sampling, or surveying undergraduate students at a university. The latter has its own merits and
faults: it is easier to recruit subjects, but may not be as generalizable to a large segment of the
population (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Large representative social surveys, such as
the ESS, do not fall into the typical pitfalls into which much of university research does.
Larger data sets can allow for greater specification of a statistical model and, thus, greater
precision and accuracy in estimating the size of the effect of the independent variables on the
dependent variable(s). This data set allowed for the inclusion of several relevant independent
variables to serve as statistical controls (e.g., years of education, annual income, age, etc.).
Additionally, the size of the data set provided room to include confounding levels (e.g., country)
as statistical controls. Past researchers (Hajnal, 1965; Todd, 1985) found that family structure
differs across Europe and correlates with institutions. Controlling for the variance accounted for
at the country-level, due to differences in institutional structure, could not be properly implemented
in this earlier research. The design of our studies properly accounts for the variance explained by
these country-level properties, thus, providing a more accurate measure of the influence of family
structure separated from the additional variance accounted for by differences in social or political
institutions.
Although there are major advantages for this type of study design, there are limitations as
well. One limitation is that cross-sectional data only capture the point in time when the survey is
administered. When measuring whether a set of independent variables influences the development
of a preference, we can find out if there is an association, but we do not know when, how, or why
the association developed. For example, in some of our statistical models, we find differences
between those who are married and those who are not married. Because of the nature of cross105

sectional data, we cannot say that the differences occurred because of the behavior (e.g., getting
married); we can only infer that this took place given the difference found between married and
unmarried individuals.
The study designs and statistical analyses employed also do not allow us to make firm
claim about the orientation of causation. Although there is a significant relationship between
characteristics of the family and socio-political attitudes and preferences, the statistical analysis
does not indicate the direction of the effect (i.e., whether it goes from family to preferences or
from preferences to family). While the case can be made for reverse causation, it is not as clearcut as it may seem. In our studies, we are not restricting the analyses to parents or other heads of
household. The effects of family characteristics on socio-political preferences across all studies
are found for individuals in all possible family positions. Some respondents may be head of
household; others may be children, siblings, or other relatives. Reverse causation would be a more
plausible argument if the studies were restricted to just those who are in charge of the household
or those who created the household, as their preferences would be influencing their decisions to
have a larger family.
Even if we are wrong about the direction of causality, we found significant and substantial
relationships, which can be used to generate new hypotheses and studies for testing them. These
results can be used to further look at what is taking place through other methods, such as on-theground ethnographic methods and more systematic approaches that utilize methods from
ethnoscience (i.e., to get at how people categorize and understand the world around them). Based
on the results produced through our big data statistical analyses, future research should employ
study designs that allow for more fine-grained data collections, experimentations, and statistical
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analyses that would adequately and appropriately measure the causal effect of family on various
socio-political measures.

Future Research
Our studies found strong and significant relationships between characteristics of the family
and socio-economic-political values, attitudes, and preferences. The data source restricts the
inferences we can make based on the results from our studies. Alternative approaches to designing
a research study may allow for greater inference and a firmer causal claim to be made. Future
research should begin looking into collecting data longitudinally on single cohorts of participants
or attempt to develop experimental protocols with strictly controlled manipulations.
Longitudinal studies can allow for a stronger case to be made for the shift in preferences
responding to changes in life circumstances. For our studies, we were only able to test betweensubject differences at discrete moments in time (i.e., when the subject was surveyed). Longitudinal
design would allow for testing between pre and post-measurement of the effect of changes in
family circumstance (e.g., adding a member to the household, getting married, etc.) with various
relevant dependent variables (e.g., adherence to tradition and custom). While a stronger causal
claim could be made, since there would be measures before and after changes in life circumstances,
it would still face problems associated with not having strict experimental controls. Additionally,
following a large enough cohort of individuals around to implement robust statistical modeling
methods (e.g., multi-level modeling or latent variable modeling) would be quite difficult.
Longitudinal studies typically face issues relating to the time and cost of following participants,
maintaining connection to participants, and, ultimately, participants dropping out of the study.
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Making much stronger causal claims would require the development of experimental
protocols. Unfortunately, true experimental research methods for social research are difficult to
develop. Natural experiments can be utilized, but this is essentially the same as cross-sectional
survey data: the manipulation (e.g., size of family, which family members you live with, etc.) is
not something that can be assigned. Additionally, other relevant confounding variables, such as
income, education, and country origin, would also require statistical controlling. Finding an
experimental design that would be ecologically valid and generalizable would be a major
challenge, especially given the complexity of the studied phenomenon and the inability to
experimentally control for all relevant aspects that influence the dependent variables of interest.

Conclusion
The findings from the studies contained in this dissertation establish a link between the size
and composition of the family and more conservative attitudes and preferences. By targeting three
distinct aspects of conservatism: (1) preference for stability, (2) devaluation of individual
autonomy, and (3) preference for social cohesiveness, we are better able to make the case for
family composition and size influencing preferences and behavior. Expanding on past research
(e.g., Hajnal, 1965; Todd, 1985), we have better identified some of the mechanisms by which
family forms might influence the development of social, political, and economic institutions. The
findings from this research will allow future researchers to test more fine-grained hypotheses that
can shed more light on the causal nature of family life on the development of individual
preferences.
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